Last updated at Tue, 18 Jul 2017 20:00:54 GMT
Last week, some important new developments in the way the US government deals with hackers were unveiled: the first ever vulnerability disclosure policy of the Department of Defense. Touted by Secretary Ash Carter as a ‘see something, say something' policy for the digital domain, this not only provides guidelines for reporting security holes in DoD websites, it also marks the first time since hacking became a felony offense over 30 years ago, that there is a legal, safe channel for helpful hackers who want to help secure DoD websites, a way to do so without fear of legal prosecution.
This is historic.
We don't often see this type of outreach to the hacker community from most private organizations, let alone the US government. In a survey of the Forbes Global 2000 companies last year, only 6% had a public method to report a security vulnerability. That means 94% of well-funded companies that spend millions on security today, buying all kinds of security products and conducting “industry best practice” security measures and scans, have not yet established a clear public way to tell them about the inevitable: that their networks or products still have security holes, despite their best efforts.
The simple fact that all networks and all software can be hacked isn't a surprise to anyone, especially not attackers. Breach after breach is reported in the news. Yet the software and services upon which the Internet is built have never had the broad and consistent benefit of friendly hacker eyes reporting security holes to get them fixed. Holes go unplugged, breaches continue.
This is because instead of creating open door policies for vulnerability disclosure, too many organizations would rather postpone having to deal with it, often until it's too late. Instead, helpful hackers who “see something,” often don't “say something” because they were afraid that it might land them in jail.
I myself as a hacker have observed and not reported vulnerabilities in the past that I stumbled upon outside of a paid penetration test because of that very real fear. I've built vulnerability disclosure programs at two major vendors (Symantec and Microsoft), in order to shield employees of those companies who found other organizations' vulnerabilities from the concerns that they may face an angry bug recipient alone.
Even then, wearing the mighty cape of a mega corporation, I and others trying to disclose security holes to other organizations encountered the same range of reactions that independent researchers face: from ignoring the report, to full on legal threats, and one voicemail that I wish I'd saved because I learned new swear words from it. For me, that is rare. But what wasn't rare was the fear that often fuels those negative reactions from organizations that haven't had a lot of experience dealing with vulnerability disclosure.
Fear, as they say in Dune, is the mind-killer. Organizations must not fear the friendly hacker, lest they let the little death bring total oblivion.
There is no excuse for organizations letting fear of working with hackers prevent them from doing so for defense. There is no excuse for lacking a vulnerability disclosure policy, in any organization, private or public sector.
The only barrier is building capabilities to handle what can be daunting in terms of facing the world of hackers. Big companies like Google, Apple, and Microsoft have had to deal with this issue for a very long time, and have worked out systems that work for them. But what about smaller organizations? What about other industries outside of the tech sector? What about IoT? And what about governments, who must walk the line between getting the help they need from the hacker community without accidentally giving free license to nation-states to hack them with an overly permissive policy?
There are guidelines for this process in the public domain, too many to list. 2017 will mark my ninth year attending ISO standards meetings, where I've dedicated myself to helping create the standards for ISO 29147 Vulnerability disclosure, and ISO 30111 Vulnerability handling processes. Until April of 2016, both of these standards were not available for free. Now the essential one to start with, ISO 29147, is available for download from ISO at no cost. Most people don't even know it exists, let alone that it's now free. But both standards act as a guide for best practices, not a roadmap for an organization to start building their vulnerability disclosure program, bit by bit.
Enter the first Vulnerability Coordination Maturity Model – a description of 5 capability areas in vulnerability disclosure, that I designed to help organizations gauge their readiness to handle incoming vulnerability reports. These capabilities go beyond engineering, and look at an organization's overall strengths in executive support, communication, analytics, and incentives.
The VCMM provides an initial baseline, and a way forward for any organization, small or large, public or private, that wants to confront their fear of working with friendly hackers, in defense against very unfriendly attackers.
The model was built over my years of vulnerability disclosure experiences, on all sides of that equation. I've done so in open source and closed source companies, as the hacker finding the vulnerability or as the vendor responding to incoming vulnerabilities, and as the coordinator between multiple vendors in issues that affected shared libraries, many years before Heartbleed was a common term heard around the dinner table.
I was fortunate to be able to present this Vulnerability Coordination Maturity Model at the Rapid7 UNITED Summit a few weeks ago, and my company was honored to work directly with the Department of Defense on this latest bit of Internet history. And though I'm known for creating Microsoft's first ever bug bounty programs, and advised the Pentagon on the first ever bug bounty program of theirs, now my work focuses more heavily on core vulnerability disclosure capability-building, and helping organizations overcome their fears in dealing with hackers.
The way I see it, if 94% of Forbes Global 2000 is still lagging behind the US government in its outreach to helpful hackers, my work is best done far earlier in an organization's life than when they are ready to create cash incentives for bugs. In fact, not everyone is ready for bug bounties, not public ones anyway, unless they have the fundamentals of vulnerability disclosure ready. But that's a topic for another day.
Today, as we bear witness to a significant positive shift in the US government's public work with hackers, I'm filled with hope. Hope that the DoD's new practice of vulnerability disclosure programs and bounties will expand as a successful model to the rest of the US government, hope that other governments will start doing this too, hope that the rest of the Forbes top 2000 will catch up, and hope for every interconnected device looming on the Internet of Things to come.
Today, we have no time to fear our friends, no matter where in the world or on the Internet they come from. There is no room for xenophobia when it comes to defending the Internet. Together, we must act as defenders without borders, without fear.