Last updated at Tue, 06 Mar 2018 23:46:32 GMT
Rapid7 Labs keeps a keen eye on research and findings from other savvy security and technology organizations and noticed Cloudflare’s report on new distributed denial of service (DDoS) amplification attacks using memcached
. If you haven’t read Cloudflare’s (excellent) analysis yet, the TLDR is, memcached
over UDP makes for an ideal amplifier — the spoofed source requests from an attacker are tiny, and the resulting replies to the spoofed source can be enormous.
Rapid7’s Project Sonar sees well over 100,000 exposed memcached
servers at any given time
memcached
Node Viewmemcached
Node ViewThat’s quite a spread of potential DDoS soldiers just sitting and waiting to be brought into the amplification army.
Since we perform both active and passive internet information and intelligence gathering, we also took a look at the data from our Heisenberg Cloud honeypot agent network thinking we’d see somewhat similar activity to that of Cloudflare. What we found was far more interesting (and inspired this post).
On February 20th (about four days before Cloudflare’s reported attack), we saw a spike in memcached
probes:
When we correlated the source IPv4s with our Sonar data we noticed that none of the IPv4s talking to Heisenberg were in the memcached
data set.
Our source lists are also very different:
Country | Number of nodes |
---|---|
United States | 257 |
China | 108 |
Russia | 8 |
Romania | 7 |
Seychelles | 6 |
United Kingdom | 6 |
France | 4 |
Germany | 3 |
Iran | 3 |
Netherlands | 3 |
Other | 10 |
ASO | AS # | Unique IPs |
---|---|---|
Hurricane Electric, Inc. | AS6939 | 189 |
No.31,Jin-rong Street | AS4134 | 51 |
CNCGROUP China169 Backbone | AS4837 | 39 |
LeaseWeb Netherlands B.V. | AS60781 | 36 |
Quasi Networks LTD. | AS29073 | 8 |
Flokinet Ltd | AS200651 | 7 |
China Unicom Shanghai network | AS17621 | 5 |
Digital Ocean, Inc. | AS14061 | 5 |
B2 Net Solutions Inc. | AS55286 | 4 |
Steadfast | AS32748 | 4 |
Other | Other | 54 |
Rapid7’s early warning system caught the protocol probes for active/exposed memcached
servers just a few days before the amplification attacks started. Since we just track payloads and connections to 11211 and do not try to emulate a full memcached
server, the bot herders mostly left us alone, though we are still tracking more elevated probe counts than we were seeing before the DDoS campaign began.
We have a better picture of what infrastructure is going into this novel DDoS campaign and must echo Cloudflare’s advice: double check your use of memcached
and secure your configurations.
We have a Metasploit module in the works that will scan for and identify memcached
instances that are vulnerable to amplification attacks, so keep an eye out!
Banner image "Summer Time on Loop" by Dane Deaner