Geopolitics has become a significant risk factor for today’s organizations, transforming cybersecurity into a technical and strategic challenge heavily influenced by state behavior. International tensions and the strategic calculations of major cyber powers, including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, significantly shape the current threat landscape. Businesses can no longer operate as isolated entities; they now function as interconnected global ecosystems where employees, suppliers, cloud workloads, supply chains, and data flows intersect across multiple jurisdictions, each with its own unique set of political risks.
A region considered low-risk last month could become a high-risk zone overnight if a diplomatic dispute escalates. An overseas development team could suddenly become vulnerable if that region experiences sanctions, stricter regulations, or state pressure on the workforce.
Many organizations still underestimate this dynamic reality, relying on static risk models that assume relatively stable attack patterns. However, geopolitical decisions and internal vulnerabilities are often the drivers of the most sudden and consequential changes in exposure. For example, the announcement of sanctions can trigger retaliatory cyberattacks, a military buildup can unleash destructive campaigns, and a trade or intellectual property dispute can lead to large-scale espionage.
Cybersecurity leaders must therefore integrate geopolitical intelligence directly into their operational decision-making and risk assessment processes, recognizing that political forces, rather than technical errors, are often the primary trigger for increased vulnerability.
Geopolitics as a core driver of cyber risk
Geopolitics plays a decisive role in shaping the scale, direction, and sophistication of cybercriminal and state-sponsored activity, fundamentally altering the threat landscape for organizations worldwide. Geopolitical tensions and sanctions often create conditions in which state-aligned hackers operate with greater freedom, using cyber operations as tools for espionage, economic survival, political retaliation, or strategic influence. Isolated or sanctioned states often turn to cybercrime as an alternative source of revenue.
North Korea, for instance, intensifies financially motivated campaigns, including cryptocurrency theft and extortion, when economic pressure mounts. Iran, facing recurring sanctions and political isolation, tends to respond with retaliatory or disruptive cyber operations targeting sectors and institutions associated with adversarial nations.
China’s cyber activity often peaks during moments of heightened competition over technology and strategic resources, driving expansive espionage campaigns aimed at industries like aerospace, telecommunications, AI, and energy. Russia, meanwhile, escalates disruptive or destructive cyber actions during geopolitical confrontations or military conflicts, leveraging malware, industrial system interference, and coordinated information operations.
These patterns demonstrate how cyber risk extends far beyond technical vulnerabilities: organizations become targets because of their nationality, sector, technology assets, or global partnerships.
How geopolitical tensions influence threat actor behavior
Geopolitical tensions influence the behavior of threat actors by altering their objectives, aggression levels, and operational trade-offs in ways that directly impact global organizations. Russian groups, for example, will shift from covert intelligence collection to overt disruption, employing destructive malware, DDoS attacks, and infrastructure sabotage to exert pressure. Chinese actors are known to intensify long-term espionage and supply-chain infiltration, targeting IP, cloud providers, security firms, and development environments.
Iran responds to sanctions or regional tensions with opportunistic retaliation through data wiping, defacements, and financially motivated attacks. And when facing economic strain, North Korea expands cybercrime, including cryptocurrency theft, extortion, software supply-chain poisoning, and high-level financial fraud.
For organizations, these shifts manifest internally as newly observed attack patterns, such as targeted phishing aimed at political or strategic sectors, the exploitation of vulnerabilities relevant to conflicts, or supply-chain attacks aligned with espionage objectives. The unifying pattern is that geopolitical tensions cause attackers to reprioritize, whereby espionage becomes a means of destruction, revenue generation becomes a national strategy, and symbolic retaliation becomes an operational necessity. Security teams that do not account for these geopolitical triggers risk misjudging the scale, intent, and urgency of incoming threat campaigns.
Indicators that cyber escalation is coming
A cyber escalation is rarely an isolated phenomenon; it is usually accompanied by political and technical warning signs that can herald a wave of attacks. On the political front, organizations should monitor events such as sanctions announcements, diplomatic expulsions, military mobilizations, sudden breakdowns in negotiations, strategic military strikes, or public accusations of espionage. For example, tensions with Russia are often followed by cyber influence campaigns. Retaliatory cyberattacks are also common following the imposition of sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Increased cyber espionage campaigns coincide with periods of strategic competition with China, and financially motivated attacks intensify after economic pressure is exerted on North Korea.
On a technical level, the first warning signs manifest in one or more of the following ways:
- An increase in sector-specific phishing attacks linked to political events
- The reactivation of known command and control infrastructures
- The formation of new politically-motivated hacktivist collectives
- Access intermediaries launching campaigns to sell access points in sectors linked to ongoing conflicts
Internally, organizations may sometimes observe unusual activity from cybersecurity teams, such as unexpected code updates from maintenance managers located in politically sensitive regions, vendor outages correlated with geopolitical developments, or authentication anomalies linked to regions near ongoing crises. The most important pattern to recognize is convergence: when political escalation, external surveillance, and internal anomalies appear within the same time frame, organizations must assume that threat conditions have shifted from background noise to active risk and immediately adopt a strengthened defensive posture.
Adjusting defensive posture during geopolitical instability
Harden identity infrastructure against state-grade threats.
Identity has become a frontline asset in geopolitical conflict. In today’s environment, the boundaries between hacktivism, cybercrime, and state-sponsored activities are increasingly blurred, with governments at times guiding or amplifying these operations. Credential compromise is often the entry point that enables these broader campaigns. To mitigate this risk, organizations should enforce universal, phishing-resistant MFA, regularly review and tightly govern privileged roles, particularly in sensitive geographies, and adopt just-in-time access to minimize standing privileges. These measures materially reduce exposure and strengthen resilience against sophisticated, geopolitically motivated threat actors.
Conduct targeted threat hunts
- Russia — Russian threat actors place a strong emphasis on disruption and destruction, particularly during periods of geopolitical conflict. They commonly deploy wiper malware that deletes or corrupts files and often pretend it’s ransomware. Threat hunters should watch for sudden mass file changes, system reboots, or the use of admin-level command-line tools immediately preceding damage. Russia also has advanced capabilities for ICS/OT manipulation, meaning unusual access to industrial controllers or configuration changes can be a strong indicator of potential compromise. Additionally, their operations often support information warfare, so defenders should look for compromised media or government accounts, unauthorized website changes, and targeted spear-phishing attacks tied to political events.
- China — China focuses on long-term, stealthy access rather than quick disruption. They are known for supply-chain compromises, so unusual activity from vendor accounts or anomalies in software updates should be investigated. They frequently abuse cloud identity platforms, making it essential to monitor for impossible travel logins, token theft, MFA fatigue, or suspicious OAuth applications. Chinese groups also invest heavily in credential harvesting, often trying to quietly collect usernames, passwords, and tokens over long periods. Threat hunters should look for password spraying, attempts to dump credentials, or lateral movement linked to service or personal accounts that generally don’t access sensitive systems.
- Iran — Iranian threat actors tend to be opportunistic and politically reactive, relying heavily on broad phishing campaigns. Organizations should monitor for spikes in failed logins, newly created email forwarding rules, and look-alike phishing domains. Iran also frequently conducts website defacements, so signs such as unexpected CMS admin logins, unauthorized web content changes, or DNS tampering are essential to hunt for. While generally less sophisticated than Russia or China, they can still deploy destructive malware, meaning defenders should watch for scripts or tools that mass-delete or encrypt files, suspicious scheduled tasks, and activity involving commodity RATs or .NET tools.
- North Korea — North Korea’s cyber operations are primarily financially motivated, with a strong focus on cryptocurrency theft. Threat hunters should monitor for unauthorized access to wallet systems, unusual outbound connections to cryptocurrency platforms, or abnormal API calls associated with blockchain activity. They also excel at social engineering, especially targeting finance, HR, and engineering staff by posing as recruiters or job candidates. Indicators include suspicious attachments, communication from personal email accounts, or new “contractor” accounts accessing code or financial systems. Once inside a network, their activity is typically driven by exfiltration, so large or stealthy data transfers, especially to cloud storage or foreign VPNs, are significant warning signs.
Reprioritize assets exposed to geopolitical pressure.
Identify systems and identities that become high-value targets during periods of geopolitical tension, especially those associated with sensitive regions or government-linked operations. Immediately harden them with faster patching, tighter segmentation, stricter east–west controls, and increased telemetry to concentrate defenses where state-aligned actors are most likely to strike.
Reduce external exposure on high-value frontiers.
Reduce the attack surface by removing access paths favored by advanced adversaries. Disable legacy VPNs, retire unmonitored jump servers, tighten SSO/IdP trust paths, and eliminate unnecessary remote-admin or broad cloud access routes. Reducing weak entry points raises the cost of initial access for foreign intelligence units.
Harden response capabilities
Incident response teams must prepare for an increased likelihood of destructive or politically motivated attacks. Organizations should test their data destruction and destructive attack plans, validate their disaster recovery timelines, and ensure the restoration of offline or immutable backups. Management must be kept informed of evolving geopolitical risks, and cross-functional teams, including cybersecurity, legal, communications, and operations, must conduct crisis simulation exercises. Rapid response structures, such as crisis management teams, should be ready to be activated to facilitate fast decision-making under pressure. These measures are intended to help ensure that the organization can respond effectively even in the face of significant stress or disruption.
Building a geopolitical cyber attack surface map
Building a geopolitical map of the attack surface enables organizations to anticipate how political conditions may impact cyber risk. This involves understanding how people, technology, and third-party relationships are geographically distributed, and how those distributions intersect with jurisdictions that may impose legal, operational, or conflict-related risks. A robust map also integrates geopolitical assessments with business impact and criticality, enabling organizations to see where instability or state control could affect privileged access, essential services, or sensitive data.
The following steps describe how to perform an attack surface mapping based on geopolitical events. These steps are not derived from any single framework or source; they are a practical blend of best practices for mapping infrastructure, assessing geopolitical exposure, identifying weak points, and prioritizing remediation.
- Map Internal Workforce: Create an authoritative inventory of the physical locations of all employees with technical or elevated privileges. Include full-time staff, contractors, and outsourced teams. Use HR, IAM, and staffing records to ensure accuracy and maintain updates as personnel relocate or roles change.
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Map Infrastructure: Create a comprehensive list of regions that host your cloud services, data centers, disaster recovery sites, and replication routes. Document which workloads reside where, how traffic moves between regions, and what operational responsibilities each location carries. Capture both primary and failover arrangements.
- Map Vendor & Subcontractor: This step requires suppliers to disclose the actual countries where engineering, customer support, managed services, and subcontracted tasks are performed. Validate this information through audits, questionnaires, or contractual obligations. Record each operational footprint, not just corporate registration locations.
- Geopolitical Risk Scores: Apply a standardized scoring model to each region (e.g., Matteo Iacoviello Geopolitical Risk (GPR) index, BlackRock Geopolitical Risk Indicator (BGRI), or Bloomberg’s geopolitical risk scores). Inputs may include government stability indicators, international sanctions status, regulatory pressures, history of state intervention, and exposure to espionage or cyber operations. Use a consistent scoring range.
- Overlay Business Criticality: Cross-reference each region’s risk score with the operational value of what that region supports. Identify where highly sensitive systems, privileged roles, or essential processes are located in areas with higher risk. Highlight areas where disruption would impact business continuity or security posture.
- Identify Regional Strategic Points: Look for dependencies where a single region hosts an excessive number of critical people, systems, or vendors. This includes cloud regions serving multiple core workloads, a subcontractor with a heavily centralized team, or a country where several key staff reside. Flag these for targeted risk discussions.
- Prioritize Remediation Measures: Develop a ranked set of actions based on the combined geopolitical and business impact. Potential responses include redistributing workloads across safer regions, shifting privileged roles, tightening access controls, enhancing monitoring for at-risk locations, or preparing contingency plans for rapid relocation or provider transition.
Conclusion
Geopolitics is now a key driver of cyber risk, redefining attacker profiles, motivations, and the organizations targeted and/or affected by collateral damage. Many vulnerabilities in modern businesses stem not from technical misconfigurations, but from the geopolitical interconnectedness of global supply chains, cloud architectures, distributed teams, and open-source ecosystems.
Traditional cybersecurity controls remain essential, but are insufficient on their own as they fail to account for laws, political incentives, national strategies, and human vulnerabilities influenced by the world's most active cyber powers. To manage this reality, organizations must integrate geopolitical analysis into every layer of their security decision-making process, consider geography as a key security variable, and develop the agility to proactively adapt their posture to the evolving global context.
