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Centos Linux: CVE-2021-21295: Moderate: Satellite 6.11 Release (CESA-2022:5498)

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Centos Linux: CVE-2021-21295: Moderate: Satellite 6.11 Release (CESA-2022:5498)

Severity
3
CVSS
(AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N)
Published
03/09/2021
Created
07/16/2022
Added
07/14/2022
Modified
07/14/2022

Description

Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.

Solution(s)

  • centos-upgrade-foreman-cli
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-amazing_print
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-apipie-bindings
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-clamp
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-domain_name
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-fast_gettext
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-foreman_maintain
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-hammer_cli
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_admin
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_ansible
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_azure_rm
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_bootdisk
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_discovery
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_openscap
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_remote_execution
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_tasks
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_templates
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_virt_who_configure
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_webhooks
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-hammer_cli_katello
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-hashie
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-highline
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-http-cookie
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-jwt
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-little-plugger
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-locale
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-logging
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-mime-types
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-mime-types-data
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-multi_json
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-netrc
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-oauth
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-powerbar
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-rest-client
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-unf
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-unf_ext
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-unf_ext-debuginfo
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-unf_ext-debugsource
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-unicode
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-unicode-debuginfo
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-unicode-debugsource
  • centos-upgrade-rubygem-unicode-display_width
  • centos-upgrade-satellite-cli
  • centos-upgrade-satellite-clone
  • centos-upgrade-satellite-maintain
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-amazing_print
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-apipie-bindings
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-clamp
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-domain_name
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-fast_gettext
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-hammer_cli
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_admin
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_ansible
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_azure_rm
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_bootdisk
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_discovery
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_openscap
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_remote_execution
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_tasks
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_templates
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_virt_who_configure
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman_webhooks
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-hammer_cli_katello
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-hashie
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-highline
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-http-cookie
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-jwt
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-little-plugger
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-locale
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-logging
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-mime-types
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-mime-types-data
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-multi_json
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-netrc
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-oauth
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-powerbar
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-rest-client
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-unf
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-unf_ext
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-unf_ext-debuginfo
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-unicode
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-unicode-debuginfo
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-rubygem-unicode-display_width
  • centos-upgrade-tfm-runtime

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