vulnerability

FreeBSD: VID-c0b13887-be44-11e6-b04f-001999f8d30b: asterisk -- Authentication Bypass

Severity
1
CVSS
(AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:N)
Published
Dec 9, 2016
Added
Dec 9, 2016
Modified
Dec 10, 2025

Description

The Asterisk project reports: The chan_sip channel driver has a liberal definition for whitespace when attempting to strip the content between a SIP header name and a colon character. Rather than following RFC 3261 and stripping only spaces and horizontal tabs, Asterisk treats any non-printable ASCII character as if it were whitespace. This mostly does not pose a problem until Asterisk is placed in tandem with an authenticating SIP proxy. In such a case, a crafty combination of valid and invalid To headers can cause a proxy to allow an INVITE request into Asterisk without authentication since it believes the request is an in-dialog request. However, because of the bug described above, the request will look like an out-of-dialog request to Asterisk. Asterisk will then process the request as a new call. The result is that Asterisk can process calls from unvetted sources without any authentication. If you do not use a proxy for authentication, then this issue does not affect you. If your proxy is dialog-aware (meaning that the proxy keeps track of what dialogs are currently valid), then this issue does not affect you. If you use chan_pjsip instead of chan_sip, then this issue does not affect you.

Solutions

freebsd-upgrade-package-asterisk11freebsd-upgrade-package-asterisk13

References

Title
NEW

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