In coders/xbm.c in ImageMagick 7.0.6-1 Q16, a DoS in ReadXBMImage() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted XBM file, which claims large rows and columns fields in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop over the rows would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.
| Product | Vendor Advisory | Solution File | Added | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debian | — | Upgrade imagemagick | Feb 25, 2019 | Sep 7, 2017 |
| Gentoo Linux | — | Upgrade media-gfx/imagemagick. | Nov 13, 2017 | Sep 7, 2017 |
| Redhat_linux | — | No solution exists | Jul 9, 2025 | Sep 7, 2017 |
| Suse | — | Upgrade libMagickWand1Upgrade ImageMagick-config-6-upstreamUpgrade libMagick++-6_Q16-3Upgrade libMagickCore-6_Q16-1Upgrade ImageMagick-config-6-SUSEUpgrade libMagickWand1-32bitUpgrade perl-PerlMagickUpgrade libMagickCore1-32bitUpgrade ImageMagickUpgrade ImageMagick-develUpgrade libMagickWand-6_Q16-1Upgrade libMagick++-develUpgrade libMagick++1Upgrade libMagickCore-6_Q16-1-32bitUpgrade libMagickCore1 | Dec 20, 2017 | Sep 7, 2017 |
| Ubuntu | — | Upgrade libmagickcore-6.q16-3-extraUpgrade libmagickcore-6.q16-3Upgrade libmagickcore-6.q16-2Upgrade libmagick++-6.q16-5v5Upgrade imagemagickUpgrade imagemagick-6.q16Upgrade libmagick++5Upgrade libmagickcore-6.q16-2-extraUpgrade libmagickcore5-extraUpgrade libmagick++-6.q16-7Upgrade libmagickcore5 | Jun 19, 2018 | Sep 7, 2017 |
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