Generating the ECDSA nonce k samples a random number r and then truncates this randomness with a modular reduction mod n where n is the order of the elliptic curve. Meaning k = r mod n. The division used during the reduction estimates a factor q_e by dividing the upper two digits (a digit having e.g. a size of 8 byte) of r by the upper digit of n and then decrements q_e in a loop until it has the correct size. Observing the number of times q_e is decremented through a control-flow revealing side-channel reveals a bias in the most significant bits of k. Depending on the curve this is either a negligible bias or a significant bias large enough to reconstruct k with lattice reduction methods. For SECP160R1, e.g., we find a bias of 15 bits.
| Product | Vendor Advisory | Solution File | Added | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debian | — | Upgrade wolfssl | May 15, 2025 | Aug 27, 2024 |
| Freebsd | — | Upgrade netatalk3 | Sep 10, 2024 | Sep 9, 2024 |
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