CVE-2026-15893: Reachable Assertion

net_if_ipv6_calc_reachable_time() in subsys/net/ip/net_if.c derives a randomized ND reachable time from ipv6->base_reachable_time as min_reachable + sys_rand32_get() % (max_reachable - min_reachable), where min_reachable = base/2 and max_reachable = 3*base/2 using integer division. When base_reachable_time is 1, both min_reachable and the modulus collapse so the function returns 0, and net_if_ipv6_set_reachable_time() stores that 0 into ipv6->reachable_time.

The base_reachable_time is attacker-controlled: handle_ra_input() in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c accepts the Reachable Time field of an incoming Router Advertisement whenever it is nonzero and <= MAX_REACHABLE_TIME, so a single unauthenticated, link-local RA carrying a Reachable Time of 1 drives the computed reachable time to 0. Router Advertisements are unauthenticated by default and require only adjacency to the target link.

When a neighbor is subsequently confirmed reachable, net_ipv6_nbr_set_reachable_timer() reads the value and executes NET_ASSERT(time, "Zero reachable timeout!"). On builds with CONFIG_ASSERT enabled this triggers a fatal kernel assertion — a remote denial of service; on builds without assertions the reachable timer is armed with K_MSEC(0) and fires immediately, forcing reachable neighbors into perpetual re-solicitation (STALE), degrading Neighbor Discovery. The impact is limited to availability; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity consequence.