On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target "Pwn Request" misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity. Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.
| Product | Vendor Advisory | Solution File | Added | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tanstack | — |
Isolate affected systems before revoking tokens, remove all compromised @tanstack/* versions, upgrade to patched releases, and rotate every credential accessible during the malicious install.
| Jun 5, 2026 | May 11, 2026 |
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