FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the Juniper router integration plugin. The _log() function in src/juniper_plugin/fastnetmon_juniper.php (lines 117-118) constructs shell commands by concatenating the $msg parameter directly into exec() calls: exec("echo `date` \"- {FASTNETMON] - " . $msg . " \" >> " . $FILE_LOG_TMP). The $msg variable contains unsanitized data derived from command-line arguments argv[1] through argv[3], which represent the attack IP address, direction, and power. While FastNetMon's C++ core currently passes IP addresses via inet_ntoa() (which only produces safe dotted-decimal notation), the PHP script performs no input validation or shell escaping. If the script is invoked directly, by another orchestration system, or if future code changes pass string-sourced IPs, arbitrary commands can be injected. The correct fix is to replace exec() with file_put_contents() or use escapeshellarg() on all parameters.
| Product | Vendor Advisory | Solution File | Added | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debian | — | Upgrade fastnetmon | Jul 23, 2026 | Jul 23, 2026 |
| Ubuntu | — | Upgrade fastnetmon (Ubuntu Pro) | Jun 16, 2026 | Jun 15, 2026 |
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