In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async
[Why&How] dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async() copies payload->length bytes into a 16-byte stack buffer (dpaux.data[16]) guarded only by an ASSERT(), which is a no-op in release builds. If a caller ever passes length > 16 this results in a stack buffer overflow via memcpy.
Additionally, link_index is used to dereference dc->links[] without bounds checking against dc->link_count, risking an out-of-bounds access.
Replace the ASSERT with a hard runtime check that returns false when payload->length exceeds the destination buffer size, and add a bounds check for link_index before it is used.
(cherry picked from commit ba4caa9fecdf7a38f98c878ad05a8a64148b6881)
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