CVE-2026-80944: Undefined Security Weakness

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: mwifiex: Detach sync cmd buffer on interrupted wait

mwifiex synchronous commands keep the caller-provided data buffer in cmd_node->data_buf. Several callers pass stack-allocated objects there.

If wait_event_interruptible_timeout() is interrupted, the caller can return and release that stack object while the firmware command is still the current command. A late firmware response then reaches the normal response handler, which can copy data through cmd_node->data_buf into the stale stack address.

This fixes a stack corruption observed during repeated association and disassociation cycles. The panic trace showed the command wait being interrupted immediately before a bad pointer dereference:

cmd_wait_q terminated: -512 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 002c583837384662 Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted ... Tainted: [M]=MACHINE_CHECK

The fault address decodes as little-endian ASCII:

0x002c583837384662 -> "bF878X,\0"

which is a fragment of the VERSION_EXT firmware string exposed as debugfs "verext":

w8997o-V4, RF878X, FP92, 16.92.21.p153.7

The same runs also showed corrupted control data containing:

0x2400372e333531 -> "153.7\0$"

which is the tail of the same VERSION_EXT string. This points at a late VERSION_EXT response writing through a stale stack-backed data_buf after the interrupted wait returned.

After cancelling pending commands on an interrupted or timed-out wait, detach the caller-owned data buffer from the still-current command. This preserves the existing command cancellation behaviour while preventing a late response from writing through a pointer whose lifetime ended with the waiting caller.

Tested on an i.MX8MP board using an 88W8997.