In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: check truncate permission under inode lock
nfsd_setattr() checks whether a size update needs NFSD_MAY_TRUNC before it takes inode_lock(). The comparison uses the file size sampled by that unlocked read, but the actual ATTR_SIZE update is applied later under inode_lock() by notify_change().
This leaves a TOCTOU window for append-only files. If a client sends a SETATTR that does not shrink the file at the time of the unlocked sample, a concurrent append can extend the file before nfsd_setattr() takes inode_lock(). notify_change() then applies a real truncation without the NFSD_MAY_TRUNC check that rejects IS_APPEND(inode). The VFS truncate syscall paths perform their own append-only checks before calling notify_change(), so NFSD must make this decision against the locked size it is about to change.
Split the write-count acquisition from the truncation permission check. Keep get_write_access() before the locked setattr work, then recheck whether the requested size is below i_size_read(inode) after inode_lock() has been acquired and before notify_change(ATTR_SIZE). This also avoids the plain unlocked inode->i_size load.
| Product | Vendor Advisory | Solution File | Added | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debian | — | Upgrade linux-6.12Upgrade linux | Sep 30, 2026 | Sep 11, 2026 |
| Redhat_linux | — | No solution exists | Sep 23, 2026 | Sep 11, 2026 |
| Vmware Photon_os | — | Use 'tdnf update' to upgrade all packages to the latest version. | Oct 13, 2026 | Sep 11, 2026 |
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