In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning
ACOMP_REQUEST_ON_STACK() reserves only enough storage for the synchronous fallback. When an async implementation is selected, callers clone that stack request before retrying, but acomp_request_clone() currently copies only the stack-sized object. The clone therefore has no storage for the async provider request context, and providers such as QAT write past the allocation through acomp_request_ctx(). KASAN does report a slab OOB write.
Allocate a zeroed clone large enough for the runtime acomp request size, copy only the bytes present in the source object, and preserve the existing fallback-on-allocation-failure behavior. Use the runtime reqsize because an implementation may adjust it during tfm initialization.
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