In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: Fix index_root heap OOB write in ntfs_ir_to_ib()
ntfs_ir_to_ib copies all entries from index_root into a freshly allocated index_block_size-byte buffer without verifying that the entries fit in the available space. The entries in index_root may be larger than the usable entry space in the index block.
This can cause OOB writes past the end of the allocation.
The validator ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() checks that entries are self-consistent within the IR value, but never cross-checks them against index_block_size. There is no bounds check in ntfs_ir_to_ib() before the memcpy.
Fixing this at the sink in ntfs_ir_to_ib() since ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() validates the logical consistency of index_root as a structure and a root with large entries is a structurally valid root. The bug is a size conflict of ntfs_ir_to_ib(). Also, the validator is called once per inode load in ntfs_read_locked_inode() while ntfs_ir_to_ib() is only called during a reparent, a check there adds no overhead to the common path. Moreover, even a future call path that bypasses the validator would still be protected.
With NULL as first parameter of ntfs_error(), the volume error flag is never set by this call, so the device name will be absent from the error message. In any case, that the caller, ntfs_ir_reparent(), prints an error message that includes the device name on NULL returns. I think this is the best solution available without adding 'struct super_block *sb' as a parameter to ntfs_ir_to_ib().
This heap out-of-bounds write is triggered by a crafted filesystem image, which is not in the kernel threat model, anyway, fixing memory errors would be nice to keep things secure.
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