In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject tail calls directly from callback frames
A tail call from a non-zero frame is modeled as a return from that frame. The verifier makes R0 unknown and calls prepare_func_exit() for the taken branch.
When the current frame is a synchronous callback, prepare_func_exit() enforces the callback return-value contract and marks R0 precise. Since the tail-call path synthesized R0 rather than deriving it from an instruction, precision backtracking reaches the callback-calling instruction with R0 still requested and triggers the "callback unexpected regs" verifier bug. A CAP_BPF task can therefore cause a WARN and an -EFAULT BPF_PROG_LOAD.
Tail calls reachable from callbacks are already rejected later by check_max_stack_depth(). Reject a tail call made directly by a callback before constructing the inconsistent return state, using the existing diagnostic. Tail calls from ordinary subprograms keep their current behavior.
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