In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bootconfig: Fix integer overflow in initrd size check
Sashiko reported that in get_boot_config_from_initrd(), a crafted initrd with a huge bootconfig size (such as 0xFFFFFFFF) can cause the pointer arithmetic:
data = ((void *)hdr) - size;
to wrap around on 32-bit systems (or when pointer subtraction overflows). Because data wraps around, the subsequent bounds check:
if ((unsigned long)data < initrd_start)
evaluates to false, bypassing the check. The kernel then calls xbc_calc_checksum(data, size), which attempts to read 4GB of memory, hitting unmapped pages and triggering a fatal kernel page fault during early boot. Furthermore, on 64-bit systems with an initrd > 4.29 GB, an unbounded 32-bit size can similarly bypass the initrd_start check.
Fix this by: 1. Ensuring the initrd is at least large enough to contain the bootconfig footer and verifying hdr is within the initrd bounds. 2. Checking that size does not exceed XBC_DATA_MAX and does not exceed the available space between initrd_start and hdr before performing pointer subtraction.
| Product | Vendor Advisory | Solution File | Added | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debian | — | Upgrade linux | Oct 20, 2026 | Sep 25, 2026 |
| Redhat_linux | — | No solution exists | Oct 1, 2026 | Sep 25, 2026 |
| Vmware Photon_os | — | Use 'tdnf update' to upgrade all packages to the latest version. | Oct 13, 2026 | Sep 25, 2026 |
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