In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsverity: Set S_VERITY only after rollback is no longer possible
Commit f77f281b6118 ("fsverity: use a hashtable to find the fsverity_info") changed the implementation of FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY to make concurrent reads start going through fsverity verification slightly earlier than they did before.
Instead of it happening when enable_verity() calls fsverity_set_info(), it now happens when ->end_enable_verity() sets S_VERITY.
However, ext4 and btrfs can roll back verity after they set S_VERITY, causing a use-after-free.
Fix that by making ext4 and btrfs set S_VERITY only after rollback is no longer possible. On failure, don't roll back S_VERITY, but do roll back the filesystem-specific verity flag.
Also update enable_verity() to handle any future instances of this bug more safely by warning and *not* freeing the fsverity_info.
Finally, tweak some comments. Clarify one, and move information from another to its proper place in the comment for ->end_enable_verity().
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