In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ata: sata_fsl: Fix use-after-free of host_priv on probe() failure
sata_fsl_host_stop() releases hcr_base and host_priv:
static void sata_fsl_host_stop(struct ata_host *host) { struct sata_fsl_host_priv *host_priv = host->private_data;
iounmap(host_priv->hcr_base); kfree(host_priv); }
->host_stop() is called by the driver core through the ata_host_stop() devres action which ata_host_start() registers, so it is called both when the device is unbound and when probe() fails after the host has been started.
The error_exit_with_cleanup label of sata_fsl_probe() releases hcr_base and host_priv as well, and it is reachable from the two device_create_file() calls which are done after the host has been activated. In that case sata_fsl_host_stop() runs on an already freed host_priv, resulting in a use-after-free and a double iounmap()/kfree().
Add a separate error label for the failures happening after the host has been activated, which only detaches the host and leaves hcr_base and host_priv to sata_fsl_host_stop().
Note that ata_host_detach() is dropped from error_exit_with_cleanup, as that label is now only reachable while host is still NULL.
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