In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/uverbs: Fix DMABUF use-after-free during ufile cleanup
The DMABUF release can race with ufile cleanup. When the cleanup holds hw_destroy_rwsem for write, uverbs_uobject_release() fails its trylock and leaves the uobject on the ufile list, but the dma_buf is freed as soon as the release returns. The cleanup then destroys the uobject and uses the freed dma_buf:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in uverbs_dmabuf_fd_destroy_uobj+0x46/0x200 Read of size 8 at addr ff11000109cf14b0 by task repro/435 Call Trace: uverbs_dmabuf_fd_destroy_uobj+0x46/0x200 destroy_hw_fd_uobject+0x3f/0x50 uverbs_destroy_uobject+0xc5/0x380 __uverbs_cleanup_ufile+0x1a8/0x260 uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0x54/0x160 ib_uverbs_close+0x34/0x110 Allocated by task 435: dma_buf_export+0x1b5/0x530 ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_DMABUF_ALLOC+0x223/0x3f0 Freed by task 436: kfree+0x301/0x530 dentry_kill+0x14c/0x560 __fput+0x23a/0x4a0
rdma_user_mmap_entry_remove() dereferences the same pointer.
Protect the stored dma_buf pointer with a mutex and clear it before release returns. Use a shared revoke helper so uobject destruction and mmap entry removal both skip a cleared pointer. Hold a temporary uobject reference across uverbs_uobject_release() and the pointer update.
Use a separate mutex because uobject destruction can free the mmap entry before release finishes. Map and unmap use attachment->dmabuf directly, so they do not need to take the new mutex while holding the reservation lock.
With curated Threat Intelligence, you can see which vulnerabilities truly put you at risk, prioritize what matters most, and act before attackers do.
Explore Intelligence Hub