In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: account for chunk padding in sctp_init_cause()
sctp_init_cause() accepts a chunk when skb_tailroom() can hold the cause header and the payload. sctp_addto_chunk() then writes 0-3 bytes of padding before that header so the chunk stays 4-byte aligned. The check does not include the padding, and the following skb_put() calls skb_over_panic() from softirq.
Count the padding sctp_addto_chunk() is about to write. The cause length on the wire stays the header plus the payload.
Found by LLM inspection, triggered and tested the fix.
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