In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: free the task context after a grace period
A task other than the owner can free a request, io_ring_exit_work() running the local task_work of a DEFER_TASKRUN ring for example, or io_do_iopoll() reaping completions. io_put_task() then takes the else branch:
percpu_counter_sub(&tctx->inflight, 1); if (unlikely(atomic_read(&tctx->in_cancel))) wake_up(&tctx->wait); put_task_struct(tctx->task);
The first line is what lets the owner leave io_uring_cancel_generic(), and on exec it frees the tctx right after. Nothing holds that off for the remaining three lines, the task reference only covers a tctx freed along with the task_struct. It used to work out because io_uring_del_tctx_node() took the uring_lock that the freeing side holds across io_put_task(), until that moved to tctx_lock.
Free the tctx with kfree_rcu(), and enter an RCU read section in io_put_task() before the count is dropped.
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