vulnerability

FreeBSD: VID-C0B13887-BE44-11E6-B04F-001999F8D30B: asterisk -- Authentication Bypass

Severity
8
CVSS
(AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:C/A:N)
Published
Nov 28, 2016
Added
Dec 9, 2016
Modified
Feb 19, 2025

Description



The Asterisk project reports:



The chan_sip channel driver has a liberal definition


for whitespace when attempting to strip the content between


a SIP header name and a colon character. Rather than


following RFC 3261 and stripping only spaces and horizontal


tabs, Asterisk treats any non-printable ASCII character


as if it were whitespace.


This mostly does not pose a problem until Asterisk is


placed in tandem with an authenticating SIP proxy. In


such a case, a crafty combination of valid and invalid


To headers can cause a proxy to allow an INVITE request


into Asterisk without authentication since it believes


the request is an in-dialog request. However, because of


the bug described above, the request will look like an


out-of-dialog request to Asterisk. Asterisk will then


process the request as a new call. The result is that


Asterisk can process calls from unvetted sources without


any authentication.


If you do not use a proxy for authentication, then


this issue does not affect you.


If your proxy is dialog-aware (meaning that the proxy


keeps track of what dialogs are currently valid), then


this issue does not affect you.


If you use chan_pjsip instead of chan_sip, then this


issue does not affect you.




Solution(s)

freebsd-upgrade-package-asterisk11freebsd-upgrade-package-asterisk13

References

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