In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: bound num_export_targets array for mds info v2/v3
ceph_mdsmap_decode() in fs/ceph/mdsmap.c reads num_export_targets from each per-mds info record and advances the decode cursor by num_export_targets * sizeof(u32) without first checking that many bytes remain. The only upper-bound check that catches a runaway cursor (*p > info_end) is gated on info_v >= 4, because info_end is left NULL for info_v 2 and 3. When the monitor sends an MDS map whose per-mds info version is 2 or 3 with an oversized num_export_targets, the cursor moves past the message front buffer and the later export-targets loop calls the unchecked ceph_decode_32() on out-of-bounds memory.
A kernel client processes CEPH_MSG_MDS_MAP from its monitor session (net/ceph/mon_client.c dispatches it; fs/ceph/super.c routes it to ceph_mdsc_handle_mdsmap(), which sets end to the front buffer bound and calls ceph_mdsmap_decode()). A malicious or compromised monitor, or an on-path attacker on an unsigned/unencrypted messenger session, can therefore drive an out-of-bounds read in the client kernel; on x86_64 with KASAN it is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read in ceph_mdsmap_decode(). The decoded values land in the internal info->export_targets[] array, so the consequence is a kernel out-of-bounds read, not an information leak to the attacker.
Impact: a malicious or compromised Ceph monitor sending an MDS map with a per-mds info version of 2 or 3 and an oversized num_export_targets field triggers an out-of-bounds read in the CephFS client kernel.
Add a ceph_decode_need() for the export-targets array before advancing the cursor, so the bound is enforced for every info_v >= 2, not only info_v >= 4. This mirrors the count-then-need idiom already used for m_data_pg_pools later in the same function.
Compute the export-targets byte count with size_mul() and reuse that checked length when advancing the cursor, so the attacker-controlled num_export_targets multiplication fails closed on overflow rather than relying on the later kcalloc() guard.
| Product | Vendor Advisory | Solution File | Added | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Amazon Linux Ami 2 | — | Upgrade kernel-toolsUpgrade bpftool-debuginfoUpgrade python-perfUpgrade python-perf-debuginfoUpgrade kernel-headersUpgrade kernel-debuginfo-common-x86_64Upgrade perf-debuginfoUpgrade kernel-tools-debuginfoUpgrade kernel-tools-develUpgrade bpftoolUpgrade kernel-debuginfo-common-aarch64Upgrade kernel-debuginfoUpgrade kernel-livepatch-5.10.270-271.1109Upgrade kernelUpgrade kernel-develUpgrade perfUpgrade kernel-livepatch-5.15.221-157.262 | Oct 19, 2026 | Oct 19, 2026 |
| Amazon_linux_2023 | — | Upgrade perf-debuginfoUpgrade kernel-develUpgrade perfUpgrade kernel-tools-debuginfoUpgrade python3-perfUpgrade bpftoolUpgrade kernel-debuginfoUpgrade kernel-debuginfo-common-aarch64Upgrade kernelUpgrade kernel-modules-extraUpgrade python3-perf-debuginfoUpgrade kernel-tools-develUpgrade kernel-headersUpgrade bpftool-debuginfoUpgrade kernel-modules-extra-commonUpgrade kernel-debuginfo-common-x86_64Upgrade kernel-toolsUpgrade kernel-livepatch-6.1.188-233.385 | Oct 13, 2026 | Sep 11, 2026 |
| Debian | — | Upgrade linuxUpgrade linux-6.12 | Sep 30, 2026 | Sep 11, 2026 |
| Redhat_linux | — | No solution exists | Sep 21, 2026 | Sep 11, 2026 |
| Vmware Photon_os | — | Use 'tdnf update' to upgrade all packages to the latest version. | Sep 21, 2026 | Sep 11, 2026 |
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