PKCS#12 MAC verification uses an attacker-controlled comparison length, weakening the integrity check on the MAC and allowing a mismatched MAC to be accepted. The PKCS#12 verify path compared the locally computed HMAC against the MAC parsed from the PKCS#12 structure using a length taken directly from the attacker-supplied input, without first verifying that it equals the length of the digest actually produced by the configured algorithm. A truncated or zero-length stored MAC could therefore be accepted, defeating the integrity protection of the MAC.
| Product | Vendor Advisory | Solution File | Added | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alpine Linux | — | Upgrade wolfssl | Oct 20, 2026 | Jun 25, 2026 |
| Debian | — | Upgrade wolfssl | Jul 15, 2026 | Jul 15, 2026 |
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