In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: uvc: clamp SEND_RESPONSE length to the response buffer
uvc_send_response() builds the UVC control response from a user-supplied struct uvc_request_data:
req->length = min_t(unsigned int, uvc->event_length, data->length); ... memcpy(req->buf, data->data, req->length);
req->length is clamped to uvc->event_length, which is taken from the host control request wLength (up to UVC_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE, 64), and to data->length, which comes from the UVCIOC_SEND_RESPONSE ioctl and is only checked for being negative. The source buffer data->data is only 60 bytes, so a response with uvc->event_length and data->length both greater than 60 makes memcpy() read past the end of data->data.
Clamp req->length to sizeof(data->data) as well.
Covered by Rapid7
| Product | Vendor Advisory | Solution File | Added | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debian | — | Upgrade linuxUpgrade linux-6.12 | Aug 11, 2026 | Aug 11, 2026 |
| Redhat_linux | — | — | Aug 13, 2026 | Aug 10, 2026 |
| Vmware Photon_os | — | Use 'tdnf update' to upgrade all packages to the latest version. | Aug 17, 2026 | Aug 10, 2026 |
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