In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/isert: post the full-feature receive buffers after session registration
isert_put_login_tx() posts the full-feature receive buffers before __transport_register_session() runs, so an initiator that does not wait for the final Login Response can still have a SCSI command executed against an se_session whose se_tpg is NULL - the same oops as the previous patch, at target_submit+0xbe.
Post them from isert_get_rx_pdu(), which the previous patch already uses to send that response, and post them before that send: the receive queue is filled at the moment the initiator is told it may use it. Allocating there keeps the existing property that a memory allocation failure cannot happen once the final Login Response is on the wire.
The receive queue is already empty between the final Login Request and isert_post_recvm(); this moves the second point later, from a median of 92 us to 172 us over 1200 logins. Only an initiator that sends before it has been told to can reach that window, and on IB and RoCE its send is retried there until the buffers appear - isert_rdma_accept() asks for rnr_retry_count = 7. iWARP has no RNR flow control, so there the same send terminates the connection instead.
Measured over rxe, 400 login cycles per run, with an initiator that does not wait: an instrumented build counted no entries to isert_recv_done() before the buffers are posted in 10 runs, where that initiator oopsed 8 of 10 unpatched runs and 5 of 10 with only the previous patch.
Not tested: iWARP, discovery sessions over iSER, and real HCAs.
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