In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: coreboot: Validate table bounds
The existing coreboot_table_populate() bounds checks limit individual entries to the mapped length. However, coreboot_table_probe() replaces the platform resource length with header and table sizes supplied by firmware before mapping the full table.
A malformed table can overflow the 32-bit size addition or advertise an extent beyond the resource, causing the driver to map and parse memory outside the resource. A resource shorter than the fixed header is also mapped as though it contained a complete header.
Reject resources shorter than the fixed header. After validating the signature, require a complete header, calculate the advertised extent with overflow checking, and reject extents beyond the resource before remapping the table.
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