In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: prevent session binding in compound requests
A failed multichannel binding can retain its target session on the work item so that the error response can be signed. Subsequent compound commands can then use that session together with a tree connection left over from an earlier command.
Limit binding SESSION_SETUP requests to standalone messages during message validation, before smb2_sess_setup() can replace work->sess. Check both NextCommand and the current request offset to cover binding in the first, middle and last positions of a compound. The existing validation error path returns STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER and stops processing the remaining commands.
This intentionally limits support for compounded binding. It is not a protocol requirement that binding be standalone. Standalone binding and non-binding compounds retain their existing behavior, without changing session, tree or response encryption handling.
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