TLS/SSL Timing Side-Channel Attacks, aka the "Lucky Thirteen" Attack
Description
The TLS protocol 1.1 and 1.2 and the DTLS protocol 1.0 and 1.2, as used in OpenSSL, OpenJDK, PolarSSL, and other products, do not properly consider timing side-channel attacks on a MAC check requirement during the processing of malformed CBC padding, which allows remote attackers to conduct distinguishing attacks and plaintext-recovery attacks via statistical analysis of timing data for crafted packets, aka the "Lucky Thirteen" issue. The attack is also possible on implementations of SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 that incorporate countermeasures to previous padding oracle attacks. Variant attacks may also apply to non-compliant implementations.
As it is not possible to determine whether a specific SSL product, or if a vulnerable version of such a product is active on the endpoint, all SSL endpoints running CBC cipher suites are flagged as potentially vulnerable; as such they should be investigated by the end user.
Solution(s)
- ssl-disable-cbc-ciphers
- Lightweight Endpoint Agent
- Live Dashboards
- Real Risk Prioritization
- IT-Integrated Remediation Projects
- Cloud, Virtual, and Container Assessment
- Integrated Threat Feeds
- Easy-to-Use RESTful API
- Automation-Assisted Patching
- Automated Containment
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