Last updated at Tue, 11 Apr 2023 13:00:01 GMT
Prior to Mar 18, 2023, due to a reliance on client-side controls, authorized users of Raptor Technologies Volunteer Management SaaS products could effectively enumerate authorized users, and could modify restricted and unrestricted fields in the accounts of other users associated with the same Raptor Technologies customer.
Product description
Raptor Technologies Volunteer Management for Schools product is used by school districts to authenticate pre-approved volunteers, and print badges for the volunteers to use for entry to the school.
Each volunteer has an account in the Raptor Technologies system, and the account contains information about the volunteer, a photo which matches the volunteer’s photo ID, details of what buildings access is allowed to, and for what activities. This account is set up and populated by school officials after a potential volunteer submits an online application for access.
Credit
This issue was discovered by Tony Porterfield, Principal Cloud Solutions Architect at Rapid7, while using the application as an end-user. It is being disclosed in accordance with Rapid7’s vulnerability disclosure policy.
Exploitation
Prior to the fix deployed by Raptor Technologies on March 18, 2023, lack of server-side authorization checks allowed an authenticated user to edit restricted fields in the user’s own account and other users’ accounts. There are client-side controls in place to prevent these accesses, but there were gaps in the server-side checking that allowed crafted API requests to make these changes to user records.
There is a PersonID field in the profile update request payload, and it was possible to modify another user’s account by using a PersonID field that did not match that of the authenticated user. The PersonID is observed to be a relatively short decimal number that may have been prone to enumeration. The Community feature provides a list of all users with access to the same schools who have agreed to have their contact information shared. The user list returned by the server contains the PersonID for each user listed, which would have allowed an adversary to make targeted changes to specific user accounts within the community.
An example of a user’s profile page is shown below. The areas highlighted in yellow contain identity and access information sourced from the application submitted by the user. Controls in the browser client prevent a user from editing these fields when updating the profile.
When the Save button is clicked, a POST to
apps.raptortech.com/Portal/Profile/Save
Is initiated, with a payload of content type:
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
The payload includes all of the fields visible on the page (along with some that are not). The fields in this POST request’s payload are listed below, with personal information redacted.
Person.ImageName=<redacted>&
Person.PersonId=<redacted>&
Person.PersonaType=<redacted>&
Person.RequireDateOfBirth=True&
Person.RequireIdNumber=False&
Person.IdNumber_Short=<redacted>&
Scope=Client&
Person.IsOfficial=True&
Person.FirstName=<redacted>
Person.MiddleName=<redacted>&
Person.LastName=<redacted>&
Person.DateOfBirth=<redacted>&
Person.IdType=<redacted>DLID
&Person.IdNumber=<redacted>&
MaidenName=&
Gender=Male
Race=Unspecified&
ExpirationDate=<redacted>&
HoursResetDate=<redacted>&
ModifyBuildingsEnabled=False&
Email=<redacted>&
Buildings[0]=<redacted>
Functions[0]=<redacted>&
AffiliationId=<redacted>&
ProfileId=<redacted>&
Person.RequireIdType=False&
Address.Id=<redacted>
&Address.IsRequired=False&
Address.IsInternationalCountry=False&
Address.IsRequiredAndIsNotInternationalCountry=False&
Address.Line1=<redacted>&
Address.Line2=&
Address.Line3=&
Address.City=<redacted>&
Address.State=<redacted>&
Address.ZipCode=<redacted>&
Address.Country=US&
PrimaryPhone=<redacted>&
SecondPhone=&
ThirdPhone=&
PreferredLanguage=0
Impact
Updating Restricted Fields: Fields that the client prevents from modifying could be changed in the apps.raptortech.com/Portal/Profile/Save
body, with the results persisting in the user’s profile. Thus, it was possible to modify restricted fields related to the user’s identity by manipulating this request’s payload.
Updating other users’ information: The payload of the Portal/Profile/Save
request includes a field for the Person.PersonID
. It was possible to modify the profile of another user associated with the same Raptor Technologies customer by entering the other user’s Person.PersonID in the payload of the request.
Community feature discloses PersonID
s: The ‘Community’ feature presents a list of other members of the user’s community, who have opted in to sharing their information. The browser interface only displays the users’ names and contact information. However, the list of information returned by the server for the
apps.raptortech.com/Portal/Community/gvVolunteerContactInformation_Read
endpoint includes each community member’s PersonID
. Prior to the fix, this information disclosure could be combined with the lack of server-side authorization checks to make targeted changes to the accounts of other community members.
The fields included for each user in the response are listed below for reference:
{
"$id": "2",
"PersonId": <6 or 7 digits>,
"ProfileId": <5 digits>,
"FirstName": "<redacted>",
"LastName": "<redacted>",
"PrimaryPhone": "<redacted>",
"SecondPhone": "",
"Email": "<redacted>",
"AllowToContact": true,
"PreventFromBeingContacted": false,
"PrimaryPhoneDisplay": "<redacted>",
"SecondPhoneDisplay": ""
}
Remediation
On March 18, 2023, Raptor Technologies deployed an update to its Volunteer Management application to address this issue.
Since this is a SaaS / cloud-hosted solution, end users, implementers and integrators should not need to do anything to update or patch to address the issue.
Disclosure Timeline
January, 2023: Issues discovered by Tony Porterfield of Rapid7
Tue, Jan 10, 2023: First contact to the vendor, opened ticket #00711217
Mon, Jan 30, 2023: Case opened with CERT/CC, VRF#23-01-NGZBZ
Fri, Feb 17, 2023: CERT/CC VINCE case VU#679276 opened
Fri, Mar 3, 2023: Report acknowledged by the vendor, clarifications provided
Wed, Mar 8, 2023: Details discussed with the vendor, extended disclosure time by approximately 30 days
Sat, Mar 18, 2023: Fixes deployed
Tue, Apr 11, 2023: This disclosure